

*Second Edition*

*Imrān N. Hosein*

**THE CALIPHATE**  
**THE HEJĀZ**  
**AND THE SAŪDI-WAHHĀBI NATION-STATE**

**Ansārī Memorial Series**

**MASJID JĀMI'AH CITY OF SAN FERNANDO**  
**TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO**

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*First edition published in 1996 by:*

Masjid Dār al-Qurʾān,  
1514 East Third Avenue,  
Bayshore, NY 11760  
USA

*Second edition published in 2013 by:*

Masjid Jāmiʿah  
Mucurapo Street  
San Fernando  
Trinidad and Tobago

Email: [inhosein@hotmail.com](mailto:inhosein@hotmail.com)  
Website: [www.imranhosein.org](http://www.imranhosein.org)  
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Cover design by Abdullah Abu Muhammad Abdurrahmani of Skopje, Macedonia, reveals the territorial frontiers of the Ottoman Empire at the time of the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in Constantinople in 1924. The Ottoman Caliphate was replaced days later in Makkah by an Arab Caliphate, and it was that Arab Caliphate that was destroyed by the Saūdi-Wahhābis who were allies of a Zionist Judeo-Christian British *ruling-State*. It has never since been restored. Islamic eschatology delivers the absolute assurance however, that the Islamic Caliphate (*i.e., the Khilāfah State*) will be restored at the time of the advent of *Imām al-Mahdi*.

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*This edition dedicated to Abid Siddiqui  
of the Muslim Center of New York  
and to Munir of Bangladesh  
who have both supported my humble work with extraordinary love and  
devotion*



## THE HORN OF SATAN

"O Allah, bestow your blessings on our Shām. O Allah, bestow your blessings on our Yemen."

The people said, "O Messenger of Allah, and our Najd."

I think the third time the Prophet, sallallahu alaihi wa sallam, said, "There (in Najd) will occur earthquakes, trials and tribulations, and from there appears the Horn of Satan."

(Sahīh Bukhāri)

The Saudi-Wahhabis, who came out of Najd, fulfill this ominous prophesy.



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## *Ansāri Memorial Series*

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**T**he Ansāri Memorial Series is published in honor of the distinguished Islamic scholar, philosopher and *Sūfi Shaikh, Maulānā* Dr. Muhammad Fadlur Rahmān Ansāri (1914–1974). Publication of the Series began in 1997 to commemorate his 25<sup>th</sup> death anniversary.

*Maulānā* Ansāri was an Islamic scholar, a teacher and spiritual guide who spent his entire life struggling in the sacred cause of Islām in what had become an essentially godless world. His labors in that sacred cause took him on travels completely around the world several times on Islamic lecture-tours in the 1950's to 1970's. He would leave his new home in Karachi (having migrated from India when Pakistan came into being in 1947) and travel west, and then return to his home months later, from the east.

*Maulānā* was a graduate of Aligarh Muslim University, India, where he studied philosophy and religion. He derived his unique Islamic philosophical and spiritual thought from the Islamic scholar, Dr. Muhammad Iqbāl, who was the author of that masterpiece of Islamic scholarship, "*The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām.*" *Maulānā* Ansāri's great work of Islamic scholarship, "*The Qur'ānic*

*Foundations and Structure of Muslim Society*” (in two volumes), itself constituted a masterly response to Iqbāl’s call for “reconstruction of Islamic religious thought.”

He received his spiritual training from his mentor *Maulānā* Muhammad ‘Abdul ‘Aleem Siddiqui, an Islamic scholar, *Sūfi Shaikh*, and roving missionary of Islām. Most important of all, he received the *Sūfi* epistemology from both Iqbāl and *Maulānā* Siddiqui and delivered it to his students. The *Sūfi* epistemology recognized that when Truth is embraced (i.e., Islām is accepted) and is lived with sincerity and devotion to Allah Most High, it eventually enters the heart (i.e., Islām grows into *Imān*). In a *Hadīth al-Qudsi* it is reported that Allah Most High declared:

قال سبحانه وتعالى في الحديث القدسي الذي  
أخرجه الإمام أحمد في الزهد: "إن السموات  
والأرض لم تطق أن تحملني وضقن من أن  
تسعني ، وسعني قلب المؤمن الوداع اللين

“My heavens and My earth are too small to contain Me,  
but the tender and peaceful heart of My faithful servant  
can contain Me.”

This *Hadīth* vividly describes the implications of the entry of Truth into the heart. When Truth enters the heart, then a divine light (*nūrullah*) also eventually enters, and that light

permits the believer's powers of observation and internal, intuitive, spiritual insight to penetrate beyond the 'external' appearances of things to reach their 'internal' reality. At this stage of the growth of Truth in the heart, the believer now sees with two eyes – the 'external' and the 'internal' (*Dajjāl*, the false Messiah, sees with only one eye – the 'external'). The believer who pursues a '*Jihād fillah*' (i.e., a struggle 'in' Allah) is blessed with growth from *Imān* to the stage of *Ihsān*. This is also known as *Tasawwuf*, but it is better recognized as *al-Ihsān*.

It is only with inner light in the discerning heart of a true believer that the continuously unfolding Signs of Allah (*Ayātullah*) can be recognized, and only thus can the world today be read and correctly understood. Those who perceive the *reality* of the world today, know that we live in the age of *Fitan*, i.e., the Last Age or the age of *al-Qiyāmah* (which would first culminate with the *end of history* and the triumph of Islām, and then, subsequently, with *the end of the world* and its transformation into a new world).

Those who see with the *Nūr* of Allah recognize that in every thing which Allah Most High created, there is harmony between external *form* and internal *substance*. Thus is it that the *external form* of religion leads to its *internal substance*, i.e., adherence to *Shariah* make possible, through *Tariqah* and *M'arifah*, the penetration of *al-Haqiqah*.

*Dajjāl*, on the other hand, delivers a world in which *appearance* is consistently opposite to *reality*. That is the nature of the world today. Scholarship that is devoid of *Nūr* is incapable of penetrating beyond *Dajjāl's* convenient external form of paper currency for example, to reach its poisonous bogus and fraudulent internal reality. What is true of paper currencies is also true of a thousand other modern-day creations of *Dajjāl*. Scholars of Protestant Islam in particular, are consistently deceived by *Dajjāl*; they go astray, and lead others astray.

Knowledge is essentially *Nūr*. But it is only when the *Dhikr* of Allah precedes, accompanies and enriches the process of *Fikr* that knowledge is transformed into *Nūr*. The very essence of *Maulānā* Ansari's scholarship was the transformation of his vast knowledge into an ocean of *Nūr*. What was true of this *Sufi Shaikh* was also true of his teacher and guide, the *Sufi Shaikh*, *Maulānā* Muhammad 'Abdul 'Aleem Siddiqui (rahimahumullah).

*Maulānā* Ansārī devoted the last ten years of his life (1964–1974) to the establishment of the Aleemiyah Institute of Islamic Studies in Karachi. He struggled at Aleemiyah to train a new generation of scholars of Islām who would be spiritually and intellectually capable of using the Qur'ān and *Ahadīth* to understand the mysterious modern age, and to then respond appropriately to its awesome challenges. Out of his labors emerged scholars such as Dr. Waffie Muhammad and Imrān N. Hosein (Trinidad, West Indies), Dr. Abul Fadl

Mohsin Ebrāhīm, Dr. Abbās Qasim (*marhūm*), Muhammad Ali Khān and others (Durban, South Africa), Siddiq Ahmad Nāsir, Raouf Zamān and Muhammad Saffie (Guyana, South America), Alī Mustafā (Suriname, South America), Bashīr Ahmad Kīno (Mauritius), and so many others who graduated from the Aleemiyah Institute of Islamic Studies, Karachi, Pakistan.

Those who succeeded Maulānā Ansārī in respect of direction and control of the Aleemiyah Institute of Islamic Studies were a people who, to this day, lacked his Islamic scholarship, and, as a consequence, the experiment in creating a new model of higher Islamic education for producing scholars of Islam capable of responding to the challenges of the modern age has not survived his death.

The Ansārī Memorial Series consists of the following books, all written by one of *Maulānā's* students:

- ❖ Jerusalem in the Qur'ān – an Islamic View of the Destiny of Jerusalem;
- ❖ *Sūrah al-Kahf*: Text Translation and Modern Commentary;
- ❖ *Sūrah al-Kahf* and the Modern Age;
- ❖ The Religion of Abraham and the State of Israel — A View from the Qur'ān;
- ❖ Signs of the Last Day in the Modern Age;
- ❖ The Importance of the Prohibition of *Ribā* in Islām;

- ❖ The Prohibition of *Ribā* in the Qur’ān and *Sunnah*;
- ❖ Dreams in Islām – A Window to Truth and to the Heart;
- ❖ The Caliphate, the *Hejāz*, and the Saūdi-Wahhābi Nation-State;
- ❖ The Strategic Significance of the Fast of Ramadān, and *Isrā* and *M’irāj*;
- ❖ One *Jamā’at* - One *Amīr*: The Organization of a Muslim Community in the Age of *Fitan*, and
- ❖ An Islamic View of Gog and Magog in the Modern World;
- ❖ The Gold *Dinār* and Silver *Dirham* – Islām and the Future of Money;
- ❖ Madina returns to Center-Stage in *Ākhir al-Zamān*;
- ❖ Iqbāl and Pakistan’s Moment of Truth;
- ❖ Explaining Israel’s Mysterious Imperial Agenda;
- ❖ Fasting and Power, etc.

The Series, which depict at least some of the fruits of the tree that was planted by the *Maulānā*, is devoted to an effort of understanding the ‘*reality*’ of the world today, explaining it accurately, and responding to its unprecedented challenges appropriately.

Several new books were recently included in the Series. Three of them, on *Sūrah al-Kahf*, form part of a proposed quartet of books on that *Sūrah*. The book on Gog and Magog

is the third in the series, while a proposed book on *An Islamic View of Dajjāl the false Messiah or Anti-Christ* would be the fourth and last.

The Series would be incomplete without a biography of that great scholar himself – his life, works and thought. Work has already commenced on that biography and we hope that it can be successfully completed *Insha' Allah*.

*Maulānā* Ansārī honored his own *Shaikh, Maulānā* Muhammad ‘Abdul ‘Aleem Siddiqui, by establishing the Aleemiyah Institute of Islamic Studies in Pakistan, and by publishing the Aleemiyah Memorial Series. The Ansārī Memorial Series and a proposed Ansārī Institute of Islamic Eschatology to be soon established *Insha Allah*, represent a humble effort to follow in that noble tradition.





## *Preface to second edition*

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This book, written 37 years ago in 1976, is in fact a chapter of my thesis on '*Post-Caliphate Islām and the Search for a New Islamic Public Order*' for a PhD in International Relations at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva. I left Geneva in 1979 without defending the (almost completed) PhD thesis and spent the next five years attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago.

I eventually realized after leaving Geneva that my research in the thesis subject would remain significantly incomplete without a proper study and understanding of Islamic eschatology. It took me many years of effort to grasp Islamic eschatology and even then, I must confess that there are parts of the subject which still elude understanding. Nevertheless I have decided to establish, *Insha Allah*, a Institute of Islamic Eschatology, where the subject can be taught. To the best of my knowledge no such institution now exists anywhere in the Muslim world.

This revised edition of the book, with a new 'Introduction', includes that eschatological analysis of the subject that was missing in the first edition.

We now know, because of Islamic eschatology, that the Islamic Caliphate will be restored with the advent of *Imām al-Mahdi* and the return of Jesus ('alaihi al-Salām) in perhaps another 25-30 years; but we also know that it is not possible for it to be restored so long as the Gog and Magog world-order persists.

Limitations of time do not allow me the liberty of rewriting the book, and so I had to content myself with writing a new Introduction and certain other parts of the book. However there are numerous lectures of mine on topics such as '*Imām al-Mahdi and the Return of the Caliphate*', '*Imām al-Mahdi and the End-Time*', '*Pax Islamica: The Islamic Conception of an International Order*', '*The Conquest of Constantinople in Ākhir al-Zamān*', etc., books such as '*Jerusalem in the Qur'ān*' and essays such as '*Can Muslims vote in Elections of the Modern Secular State*' which, when viewed or read along with this book, would offer a greater comprehension of the eschatological dimension of the subject, *Insha' Allah*.

May Allah bless Monowara Begum who recently passed away in Bangladesh, in whose name a kind donation to meet costs of printing of this new edition of this book was made. I am also grateful to the Syed-Syeda Memorial Trust of Bangladesh (founded by Marhoom Mohammad Ezharul Hoque in memory of his parents Marhoom Syed Ahmed and Marhooma Syeda Khatoon) for a kind donation which also helped with costs of printing this edition of the book. May

Allah Most Kind have mercy upon their souls and grant them  
*Jannah al-Firdous. Amīn!*

INH

Gombak, Kuala Lumpur

*Rabī al-Thāni 1434/March 2013*



## *Preface to first edition*

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This is a third publication in the Ansāri Memorial Series, published in honor of my teacher and *Shaikh* of blessed memory, *Maulānā* Dr. Muhammad Fadlur Rahmān Ansāri (rahimahullah 1914 - 1974). The previous two publications were entitled: '*The Religion of Abraham and the State of Israel – A View from the Qur'ān*', and '*The Importance of the Prohibition of Ribā in Islām*'.

Much of the research work for this book was done during the years 1975-1979 at the United Nations Library in the *Palais des Nations*, Geneva, while I was a doctoral student in International Relations at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland.

We are experiencing, at the time of writing, a rapidly deteriorating situation in today's Muslim World with bloody conflicts inflicting unimaginable suffering on innocent Muslims in Bosnia, Kashmir, Algeria, Palestine, Chechnya etc. Yesterday it was fifty thousand Muslim women raped in Bosnia, and today's horror stories are about a son who was forced to bite off his Muslim father's testicles in Bosnia, and the innocent blind Muslim *Shaikh*, Omar Abdul Rahmān, who was condemned to life imprisonment in USA (because he

posed too great a threat to the pro-west secular regime which rules Egypt), and who is subjected to sexual humiliation by prison guards whenever a visitor visits him at the prison where he is kept.

I am now convinced that the time has at last come for this work to reach the Muslim public who may now be sufficiently shaken up to look seriously for the causes of our impotence. They may, as a consequence, take this work seriously and brush off the expected protests from establishment scholars, and the governments that they support, around the Muslim world!

I pray that Allah may accept and bless this humble effort in the cause of Truth. May it so impact upon Muslims that their eyes will be opened to the fact that the *Saūdi-Wahhābi* regime that now controls the *Haramain* and the *Hejāz* played an active role in the destruction of the Islamic Caliphate and has since then constituted an obstruction to the restoration of power for the *Ummah*. *Amīn!*

Imrān N. Hosein

*Masjid Dār al-Qur'ān*, Long Island, New York

Jumādi al-Thāni 1417/November 1996





## *Introduction*

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*“The institution of the Khilāfah in Islām represents much more than just an office of the State. It represents the State itself.”*

### **The Islamic Khilāfah state and its bogus substitute**

*Dajjāl’s* modern system of secular nation-States, republican as well as monarchies, which has embraced the entire world – including the world of Islam – is a bogus and fraudulent substitute for Islām’s *Khilāfah* State. This elementary fact seems to have mysteriously eluded the understanding of Dr Muhammad Iqbal who was one of the outstanding scholars of Islam in the modern age. Iqbal’s view of the subject, expressed in his most important work of scholarship, *‘The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam’*, was in complete agreement with secular Turkey’s bogus *Ijtihad* that

“according to the spirit of Islam, the Caliphate or Imamate can be vested in a body of persons, or an elected Assembly” (see fn 8, page 94, for full quote).

Whether it is Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Malaysia, Iran or Egypt, they are all modern secular States in the sense that they are all subject to the secular authority of the Security Council of the Zionist-created United Nations Organization. They must all submit to the secular authority of the International Monetary Fund which has prohibited the use of Gold *Dinārs* as money.

When Muslims participate in politics of the modern secular State while voting, for example, in its elections, or contesting its elections as so-called Islamic Parties, or pledging their allegiance to the King, President, *Amīr*, Constitution, etc., they validate that bogus substitute. In addition, they also drive one more nail into the coffin of the *Khilāfah* State.

This book is presented to such Muslims in order to ensure that they cannot plead for mercy on Judgement Day with the lame excuse: “I did not know!”

What then, is the *Khilāfah* State?

One of the essential characteristics of the religion of Islām is its insistence that when a people recognize

Allah Most High as ‘sovereign’ (*al-Mālik*), they must ensure that their Public Order or State and all its institutions submit to Allah’s sovereignty, supreme authority and supreme law. The Islamic *Khilāfah* State did precisely that!

If the State, rather than Allah Most High, is recognized as sovereign, if its authority is recognized as supreme and its law is recognized as the supreme law - and that is the essence of modern western civilization’s political secularism - then such a secular political philosophy and secular model of a state would be based on *Shirk* (blasphemy).

Islām recognized *Shirk* as the greatest of all sins and the Qur’ān declared of *Shirk* that it is the only sin that Allah Most High would not forgive. Consider the following declarations made by Allah Most High in the blessed Qur’ān on the subject of ‘forgiveness for *Shirk*’:

إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَغْفِرُ أَنْ يُشْرَكَ بِهِ وَيَغْفِرُ مَا دُونَ ذَلِكَ لِمَنْ يَشَاءُ وَمَنْ يُشْرِكْ بِاللَّهِ فَقَدْ ضَلَّ ضَلَالًا بَعِيدًا

“VERILY, Allah does not forgive the ascribing of divinity (which includes the divine status, power, authority and functions which are His) to aught beside Him (i.e., committing *Shirk*), although He forgives any lesser sin unto whomever He wills: for those who

ascribe divinity to aught beside Allah (i.e., commit *Shirk*) have indeed gone far astray.”

(Please carefully note that the writer’s explanatory comments are in brackets)

(Qur’ān, al-Nisā, 4:114)

إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يُغْفِرُ أَنْ يُشْرَكَ بِهِ وَيَغْفِرُ مَا دُونَ ذَلِكَ لِمَنْ  
يَشَاءُ وَمَنْ يُشْرِكْ بِاللَّهِ فَقَدْ افْتَرَىٰ إِثْمًا عَظِيمًا

“VERILY, Allah does not forgive the ascribing of divinity to aught beside Him (i.e., committing *Shirk*), although He forgives any lesser sin unto whomever He wills: for he who ascribes divinity to aught beside Allah (i.e., commits *Shirk*) has indeed committed an awful sin.”

(Qur’ān, al-Nisā, 4:48)

لَقَدْ كَفَرَ الَّذِينَ قَالُوا إِنَّ اللَّهَ هُوَ الْمَسِيحُ ابْنُ مَرْيَمَ  
وَقَالَ الْمَسِيحُ يَا بَنِي إِسْرَائِيلَ اعْبُدُوا اللَّهَ رَبِّي وَرَبَّكُمْ  
إِنَّهُ مَنْ يُشْرِكْ بِاللَّهِ فَقَدْ حَرَّمَ اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ الْجَنَّةَ وَمَأْوَاهُ  
النَّارُ وَمَا لِلظَّالِمِينَ مِنْ أَنْصَارٍ

“Indeed they reject the truth (when) they say, Behold, Allah is the Messiah, son of Mary - seeing that the Messiah [himself] said, "O Israelite people! Worship Allah [alone], who is my Lord-God as well as your Lord-God. Behold whoever commits *Shirk*, unto him will Allah deny paradise, and his goal shall be the fire: and such evildoers will have none to help them!”

(Qur’ān, al-Māida, 5:72)

It is clear from the above verse that the Israelites were committing *Shirk* – hence the Divine warning of the hell-fire.

حُنْفَاءَ لِلَّهِ غَيْرَ مُشْرِكِينَ بِهِ وَمَنْ يُشْرِكْ بِاللَّهِ فَكَأَنَّمَا  
خَرَّ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ فَتَخَطَفُهُ الطَّيْرُ أَوْ تَهْوِي بِهِ الرِّيحُ فِي  
مَكَانٍ سَحِيقٍ

“ . . . [inclining] towards Allah, [and] turning away from all that is false, without ascribing divine qualities to aught beside Him (i.e., committing *Shirk*): for he who ascribes divinity to aught but Allah (i.e., commits *Shirk*) is like one who is hurtling down from the skies - whereupon the birds carry him off, or the wind blows him away onto a far-off place.”

(Qur’ān, al-Hajj, 22:31)

We have already stated that when the State is recognized as sovereign (*al-Mālik*) rather than Allah Most High, such constitutes *Shirk*. But *Shirk* is also committed when the State (and government) legislates to make *Harām* or illegal, that which Allah Most High has declared *Halāl* or legal. The proof of this can be found in *Sūrah al-Taubah* of the Qur’ān:

اتَّخَذُوا أَحْبَارَهُمْ وَرُهْبَانَهُمْ أَرْبَابًا مِّن دُونِ اللَّهِ  
وَالْمَسِيحَ ابْنَ مَرْيَمَ وَمَا أُمِرُوا إِلَّا لِيَعْبُدُوا إِلَهًا وَاحِدًا  
لَّا إِلَهَ إِلَّا هُوَ سُبْحَانَهُ عَمَّا يُشْرِكُونَ

“They have taken their rabbis and their monks - as well as the Messiah, son of Mary - for their Lord-Gods beside Allah, although they had been bidden to worship none but the One God, save whom there is no deity: the One who is utterly remote, in His limitless glory, from anything to which they may ascribe a share in His divinity!”

(Qur’ān, al-Taubah, 9:31)

The Qur’ān had already directed attention to this worship by Christians and Jews of their Priests and Rabbis in another verse as follows:

قُلْ يَا أَهْلَ الْكِتَابِ تَعَالَوْا إِلَى كَلِمَةٍ سَوَاءٍ بَيْنَنَا وَبَيْنَكُمْ  
 أَلَّا نَعْبُدَ إِلَّا اللَّهَ وَلَا نُشْرِكَ بِهِ شَيْئًا وَلَا يَتَّخِذَ بَعْضُنَا  
 بَعْضًا أَرْبَابًا مِّنْ دُونِ اللَّهِ فَإِن تَوَلَّوْا فَقُولُوا اشْهَدُوا بِأَنَّا  
 مُسْلِمُونَ

Say: "O followers of earlier revelation! Come unto that tenet which we and you hold in common: that we shall worship none but Allah, and that we shall not ascribe divinity to aught beside Him, and that we shall not take human beings for our Lord-Gods beside Allah." And if they turn away, then say: "Bear witness that it is we who have surrendered ourselves unto Him."

(Qur'ān, Āle 'Imrān, 3:64)

The question arose however: did Christians and Jews actually worship their Priests and Rabbis?

'Adī bin Hātim, who had been a Christian before accepting Islām, once came to the Prophet (sallallahu 'alaihi wa sallam). When he heard him reciting the above verse he said, "O Messenger of Allah, but they do not worship them (i.e., Christians and Jews do not worship their Priests and Rabbis)." The Prophet replied, Yes, but they prohibit to the people what is *Halāl* and permit them what is *Harām*, and the people obey them. This is indeed their worship of them.

(Sunan Tirmīdhī)

Not only do we now know what act of *Shirk* was being committed by the Israelites, but we are also entitled to ask the fairly simple question: If it is *Shirk* when done by Priests and Rabbis, would it not also be *Shirk* when done by the State and government?

The Qur'ān is emphatic in its repeated warnings given to those (like Muslims) who have the revealed Truth with them and yet turn to other than Allah in order to vest sovereignty in the State, and supreme authority in government and law. That warning is particularly emphatic when the State legislates to prohibit (i.e. to make *Harām*) what Allah had permitted (i.e., made *Halāl*). Around the world today the modern State has prohibited many things that Allah has permitted, and has permitted much that Allah has prohibited. Around the world today all of mankind (*illa ma sha Allah*) have accepted what the State has done. And so around the world today mankind (*illa ma sha Allah*) has embraced *Shirk*. The divine condemnation of such conduct is harsh.

Conspicuous examples of such *Shirk* in the modern State are the permission to lend money on interest and

the prohibition of the use of gold and silver coins (*Dinār* and *Dirham*) as money (for buying and selling).

Consider the following verses of *Sūrah al-Māidah* and, in particular those parts of the translated text which are in *italics*:

إِنَّا أَنْزَلْنَا التَّوْرَةَ فِيهَا هُدًى وَنُورٌ يَحْكُمُ بِهَا النَّبِيُّونَ  
الَّذِينَ أَسْلَمُوا لِلَّذِينَ هَادُوا وَالرَّبَّانِيُّونَ وَالْأَحْبَارُ بِمَا  
اسْتُحْفِظُوا مِنْ كِتَابِ اللَّهِ وَكَانُوا عَلَيْهِ شُهَدَاءَ فَلَا  
تَخْشَوُا النَّاسَ وَآخِشُوا اللَّهَ وَلَا تَشْتَرُوا بِآيَاتِي ثَمَنًا قَلِيلًا  
وَمَنْ لَمْ يَحْكَمْ بِمَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ فَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الْكَافِرُونَ

“Verily, it is We who bestowed from on high the Torah, wherein there was guidance and light. On its strength did the prophets, who had surrendered themselves unto Allah, deliver judgment unto those who followed the Jewish faith; and so did the [early] men of Allah and the Rabbis, inasmuch as some of Allah’s writ had been entrusted to their care; and they [all] bore witness to its truth. Therefore, [O Israelite people,] hold not men in awe, but stand in awe of Me; and do not barter away My messages for a trifling gain: *for they who do not judge in accordance with what Allah has bestowed from on high are, indeed, Kuffār (i.e., a people who have rejected the truth).*”

وَكَتَبْنَا عَلَيْهِمْ فِيهَا أَنَّ النَّفْسَ بِالنَّفْسِ وَالْعَيْنَ بِالْعَيْنِ  
 وَالْأَنْفَ بِالْأَنْفِ وَالْأُذْنَ بِالْأُذْنِ وَالسِّنَّ بِالسِّنِّ  
 وَالْجُرُوحَ قِصَاصٌ فَمَن تَصَدَّقَ بِهِ فَهُوَ كَفَّارَةٌ لَهُ وَمَن  
 لَّمْ يَحْكَمْ بِمَا أَنزَلَ اللَّهُ فَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الظَّالِمُونَ

“And We ordained for them in that [Torah]: A life for a life, and an eye for an eye, and a nose for a nose, and an ear for an ear, and a tooth for a tooth, and a [similar] retribution for wounds; but he who shall forgo it out of charity will atone thereby for some of his past sins. *And they who do not judge in accordance with what Allah has revealed - they are the evildoers!*”

وَقَفَّيْنَا عَلَىٰ آثَارِهِم بِعِيسَى ابْنِ مَرْيَمَ مُصَدِّقًا لِّمَا بَيْنَ  
 يَدَيْهِ مِنَ التَّوْرَةِ وَآتَيْنَاهُ الْإِنْجِيلَ فِيهِ هُدًى وَنُورٌ  
 وَمُصَدِّقًا لِّمَا بَيْنَ يَدَيْهِ مِنَ التَّوْرَةِ وَهُدًى وَمَوْعِظَةً  
 لِّلْمُتَّقِينَ

“And We caused Jesus, the son of Mary, to follow in the footsteps of those [earlier prophets], confirming the truth of whatever there still remained of the Torah; and We vouchsafed unto him the Gospel, wherein there was guidance and light, confirming the truth

of whatever there still remained of the Torah, and as a guidance and admonition unto the God-conscious.”

وَلِيَحْكُمَ أَهْلُ الْإِنجِيلِ بِمَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ فِيهِ وَمَنْ لَمْ يَحْكَمْ  
بِمَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ فَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الْفَاسِقُونَ

“Let, then, the followers of the Gospel judge in accordance with what Allah has revealed therein: *for they who do not judge in the light of what Allah has bestowed from on high - it is they who are truly sinful!*”

(Qur’ān, al-Māidah, 5:44-7)

Since participation in the electoral process in such a State would be for the purpose of constituting a government which would rule on behalf of the State, those who establish political parties (including Islamic political parties) and contest those elections, as well as those who vote in such elections, would thus enter into *Shirk*.

Around the world today with very few exceptions if any, the modern secular State (and that includes Pakistan) is universally recognized as sovereign, its authority is recognized as supreme, and so too its law. And so, around the world today (including the world of

Islām) mankind is now embraced by a universal political *Shirk*. This is, in fact, one of the major signs that we now live in the age of *Dajjāl*, the false Messiah or Anti-Christ, who deceived mankind into recognizing other than Allah Most High as sovereign, and thus in worshipping other than Allah Most High.

It remains one of the abiding mysteries of the modern world of Islām that so many Islamic scholars and Islamic movements/groups such as the *Salafi* Muslims, many Sufi Orders, *Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world, *Jama'at-e-Islāmi* in Pakistan, *Parti Islām* in Malaysia, *al-Nahda* of Tunisia, Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP), etc., who participate in modern electoral politics, remain either unable or unwilling to recognize that this secular western substitute for Islām's *Khilāfah* State is based on *Shirk*. The Sufi Shaikh and his Salafi/Wahhabi rival appear to be equally blind!

Nor do they realize that *Dajjāl's* one man/one vote electoral system of political democracy is designed to break-up and erase the diversity of nations and tribes that Allah Most High created. National and tribal identities and loyalties were Divinely-designed to establish and preserve micro-social cohesion which, in

turn, ensured macro-social stability. Instead, *Dajjāl's* political system has recognized the individual as the unit of the State and this has incrementally destroyed the tribal loyalties that Allah Most High had created. The result is that around the modern world, society is unraveling to such an extent that some parts of the world now witness collapsing social orders with rampant crime that verge on anarchy.

The so-called Islamic movements and groups (and this includes the Sufi Shaikh) foolishly register themselves as political parties under the secular constitution of the modern State and then pursue a sustained effort in electoral politics in order to win elections and assume political power over the secular State. They then hope that this 'Disneyland' methodology, which is in direct and manifest violation of the *Sunnah*, and which succeeds only when they deliver *Fatāwa* denouncing terrorism and then align themselves with the terrorist Zionist West (as *Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* appears to have done in Egypt), would somehow make possible the establishment of what is described as an *Islamic State*. It is quite clear that their *Islamic State* is not the same as Islām's *Khilāfah* State but rather represents a curiously contrived entity that can

somehow be accommodated within the venomous embrace of *Dajjāl's* world of modern States in the United Nations Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, etc.

Perhaps the reason for this calamitous failure on the part of Islamic (political) scholarship and Sufi Orders that are engaged in electoral politics in the modern age is their incapacity to penetrate and grasp the *internal reality* of the modern age – a reality which can only be penetrated and understood through the study of Islamic eschatology (*‘Ilmu al-Ākhir al-Zamān*) or the Islamic conception of the End-time.

*Dajjāl* the false Messiah is the mastermind and architect who fashioned and constructed today's mysterious secular world order about which a well-known *Hadīth* declares that 999 out of every 1000 will enter into the hellfire. But even Muslims seem to be unaware of this *Hadīth*:

“Narrated Abū Sa’īd Al-Khudri: The Prophet said: On the day of Resurrection Allah will say: O Adam! Adam will reply: Labbaik our Lord, and Sa’daik. Then there will be a loud call (saying): Allah orders you to take from among your offspring a mission for the (Hell) Fire. Adam will say: O Lord! How many are they for the (Hell) Fire? Allah will say: *Out of each thousand, take out 999*. At that time

every pregnant female shall drop her load (have a miscarriage) and a child will have grey hair. "And you shall see mankind as in a drunken state, yet not drunk, but severe will be the torment of Allah". (Qur'ān, al-Hajj, 22: 2) (When the Prophet mentioned this), the people were so distressed (and afraid) that their faces got changed (in color) whereupon the Prophet said: From Y'ajūj and M'ajūj nine hundred and ninety-nine will be taken out, and one from you. You Muslims (compared to the large number of other people) will be like a black hair on the side of a white ox or a white hair on the side of a black ox and I hope that you will be one-fourth of the people of Paradise. On that we said: Allahu-Akbar! Then he said: I hope that you will be one-third of the people of Paradise. We again said: Allahu-Akbar! Then he said: (I hope that you will be) one-half of the people of Paradise. So we said: Allahu-Akbar."

(Sahīh Bukhāri)

When Muslims truly recognize Allah Most High as *al-Malik* or the sovereign, they will cease to recognize Constitution, Parliament, Supreme Court, Government etc., as sovereign. The sovereignty of Allah implies the supremacy of the religion of Islām and, in particular, the sacred law or *Shari'ah*. The institution of the *Khilāfah* symbolized that supremacy of Islām over the State and over public life. The *Khalīfah* was otherwise known as the *Amīr al-M'uminīn* or *Imām*, and he was the head of the *Jamā'ah* or community of Muslims. The members of

the *Jamā'ah* pledged their allegiance to the *Amīr* through the institution of *Bai'ah*. The territory in which that *Jamā'ah* was located was designated *Dār al-Islām*. It was so designated because the *Amīr* had the freedom and authority to enforce Allah's sacred law in that territory *as the supreme law*.

## **From Euro-Christendom to Dajjāl's modern Western civilization**

Eastern European Christian civilization was founded on recognition of divine sovereignty. In that civilization, however, it was the Church that was recognized as God's representative on the earth, and the Church established the State. This was the essence of the Christian Byzantine State that was based in the historic city of Constantinople.

When *Dajjāl*, the false Messiah, engineered the western European break with Constantinople, he then proceeded to craft a conflict between religion and the State that resulted in the defeat of the western European Church. The consequence of that defeat was that Western Europe experienced such a revolutionary transformation of the very foundations of Euro-Christendom that the State and politics were

secularized. The final chapter of the conflict, which sealed the fate of religion in Western Europe and brought an essentially godless civilization into being, was the American and French revolutions. The sphere of religion was reduced to individual and group worship, and religion was excluded from politics and the conduct of State. God was no longer recognized to be sovereign (*al-Akbar*). Instead it was the people who were sovereign, and they vested that sovereignty in the new secular model of a State. The State was now *al-Akbar*. This was *the essence of* European secularism - in which *Dajjāl* was worshiped instead of the God of Abraham (‘alaihi al-Salām).

The reader should understand that the modern secular state formed an essential part of the overall political strategy through which western Judeo-Christian Europe sought to achieve political rule over the world. In other words, the modern secular state was specifically designed to function as the instrument of political globalization that would deliver to the Judeo-Christian Zionist world-order political rule over the whole world. That process of political globalization was, in turn, linked to the creation of a Euro-Jewish State of Israel which

would eventually become the *ruling* state in the world. *Dajjāl* was the architect of this plan.

While western Europe succumbed to this new secular godless political philosophy, it was strange that Eastern European orthodox Christianity and non-European Christians did not put up a greater struggle against this secular destruction of the sacred model of a State that was created by the Prophets David and Solomon ('alaihima al-Salām) and which recognized no separation of religion from politics, and Church from State.

The mysterious roles played by the Ottoman so-called Islamic empire, the Jewish/Wall Street-executed Bolshevik revolution, and by a war-mongering western Europe in raining down continuous destruction on eastern European Christianity in general and Russia in particular, have not as yet been subjected to an Islamic eschatological investigation and analysis. It should be clear however, that such a study would almost certainly also reveal *Dajjāl* as the main actor at work in an attempt to weaken and secularize eastern orthodox Christianity as well.

*Dajjāl* not only transformed western European Christendom into godless modern western civilization,

but he also empowered that civilization with unprecedented power. He did so through a mysterious scientific and technological revolution which is still unfolding in the world. Western civilization then used that unique power to embark upon a relentless and endless immoral crusade to force the submission – at the point of a crusader’s sword – of the rest of the world to western European control. This was mostly achieved through wars of aggression, but was also achieved - sometimes through espionage and sometimes through under-cover infiltration - by proxy, when willing native clients (such as the *Saūdi-Wahhābi* alliance and Mustafa Kamāl’s Young Turks) were cleverly nurtured to become either willing servants of the west or unwitting tools of the west.

The Crusaders’ swords did not spare even their Christian brothers-in-faith. The Crusaders attacked Constantinople in 1204 and sacked the city with the objective of forcing eastern Christian submission to western Christianity. Although Byzantium recovered the city some 80 years later, the success was short-lived. Western civilization found a friend in an imperialist Ottoman Empire which proceeded to keep eastern

Christianity under its blood-stained heel for the next 500 years.

The all-powerful western civilization used its new-found power to commit wars of naked aggression which resulted in western colonization of most of the non-European world. The West then used the opportunity to transform entire civilizations - remolding them in the pattern of the new European model of the secular State and godless society. Even when the rest of the world was decolonized, it never really recovered its freedom since it was firmly shackled in such western-created and western-controlled international organizations as the United Nations Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, etc. And so the non-European world also, was eventually secularized and trapped in the deadly political and economic embrace of the west, and is fast being reduced to a godless society. This included the world of Islām. In fact the world of Islām was the special target of godless European civilization.

The process of reducing the world of Islām to a godless society commenced with the secularization of public life. The Ottoman Empire, which had long and faithfully served strategic western European interests (in particular in waging relentless unjust wars on Eastern

Byzantine Orthodox Christianity which still remains the greatest rival to Western Christianity), and in transferring the *Khilāfah* out of the Arab world, had outlived its utility and had to be targeted for destruction. This was a classic case of “killing two birds with one stone”. The world of Islām would lose their once-powerful Islamic Empire, and since the Arabs had lost the Arab *Khilāfah* for so many centuries, a destruction of the Ottoman *Khilāfah* could very well result in the loss of the *Khilāfah* itself. This double blow could possibly so stun the Arabs and Muslims as would facilitate their absorption into *Dajjāl’s* secular western world’s political order. That, in turn, would make it possible for *Dajjāl* to establish one world-government that would rule the world on his behalf.

### **From the pro-west Ottoman Empire to the pro-west Saūdi state**

The destruction of the Ottoman Empire, which was effected in the First World-War, resulted in the emergence of the secular State of Turkey. The government was constituted of secularized westernized Turkish nationalists who worked hand-in-glove with an under-ground Jewish/Zionist movement. They first

reduced the *Khilāfah* to an office that resembled that of the Pope. However when the *Khilāfat* Movement in India threatened British rule over India, Britain advised Mustafa Kamal to do the necessary and abolish the *Khilāfah* itself.

The secularization process in the world of Islām was then sealed when the *Hejāz*, under the rule of ‘Abdul ‘Azīz ibn Saūd, also joined the Turkish nationalists in the rejection of the supremacy of Islām over the State. When Saudi Arabia acceded to the Charter of the United Nations Organization, it sealed the process of political secularization. And so Arabia, the heartland of Islām, also embraced *Dajjāl’s* secular model of a State and secular international order. This represented the final destruction of the *Dār al-Islām* that had been established by the Prophet Muhammad (sallallahu ‘alaihi wa sallam).

While the *Hejāz* was *Dār al-Islām*, every Muslim had the right to enter that territory - he or she did not need a visa. There was no such thing as Saūdi sovereignty. There was no such thing as Saūdi citizenship. The right of entry into any part of *Dār al-Islām* was one of several other rights which Muslims had in that Islamic model of a State. Muslims had the right to reside in *Dār al-Islām* -

they did not need residence permits. They had the right to seek livelihood in any part of *Dār al-Islām* - they did not need work permits etc. Saudi Arabia's secularization of the very heart-land of Islām and Mustafa Kamal's replacement of the Ottoman *Khilāfah* with the militantly secular State of Turkey resulted in the denial and eventual elimination of all these rights of Muslims.

The destruction of the institution of the *Khilāfah* and the emergence of secular Muslim nation-States that mimicked the secular west were events that changed the very face of the world of Islām in a way that was unprecedented in its entire history. *Dār al-Islām* which was established by the Prophet himself, no longer exists today, not even in Makkah and Madina. Indeed the world of Islām has now returned in respect of its collective existence as an *Ummah*, to pre-*Hijri* Islām. The world of Islām, like the rest of the non-European world, has today been incorporated into a secular and materialist system of political organization constituted of the unit of the modern secular nation-State that is based on *Shirk*, and this is the anti-thesis of *Dār al-Islām*.

Islamic civilization now appears to the world to have entered permanently into the post-*Khilāfah* era of its history. And, as it was in Makkah fourteen hundred

years ago, so too today, - the Muslim community around the world is subjected to an all-embracing *Jāhiliyah* that dominates the world. That *Jāhiliyah* is, of course, *Dajjāl's* modern Judeo-Christian secular and materialist western civilization. Like its creator, *Dajjāl* the false Messiah, it is a civilization which (symbolically) has the word *Kāfir* written between its eyes on its forehead.

Let us now recall how the world of Islām responded when the Turkish Grand National Assembly announced the abolition of the *Khilāfah* and Mustafa Kamal completed the substitution for the *Khilāfah* with the secular Republic of Turkey.

Al-Azhar University responded with a declaration denouncing the Turkish act as *Bid'ah* (i.e., an innovation) while emphasizing that the *Khilāfah* was an essential part of Islām.

The declaration was fortified with the quotation of a *Hadīth* of the Prophet (sallallahu 'alaihi wa sallam) concerning the necessity of the institution of *Bai'ah*, i.e., the oath of allegiance by the people through which an appointment to the position of leadership over the *Ummah* is legitimized:

عن ابن عمر قال: سمعت رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم يقول: مَنْ خَلَعَ يَدًا مِنْ طَاعَةِ لِقِيَّ اللَّهِ يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ لَا حُجَّةَ لَهُ وَمَنْ مَاتَ وَلَيْسَ فِي عُنُقِهِ بَيْعَةٌ مَاتَ مَيِّتَةً جَاهِلِيَّةً

“...Whosoever extracts or withdraws a hand from obedience (i.e., to the lawfully-appointed Amīr) will meet Allah on Judgment Day bereft of any evidence or proof (of faith); and whoever dies without *Bai’ah* has certainly died a death of *Jāhiliyah* (which could also imply a death in an age which has witnessed the return to the pre-*hijri Jāhiliyah*)”.

(Sahīh Muslim)

The declaration concluded with a call for an international Islamic *Khilāfah* Conference in Cairo which would respond in an appropriate way to the decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, in March 1924, to abolish the *Khilāfah*.

The Conference itself, which was held in 1926, adopted resolutions which incorporated the above *Hadīth* of the Prophet (sallallahu ‘alaihi wa sallam) and affirmed the necessity of the institution of the *Khilāfah*, and hence, the Islamic Public Order, for the world of Islām.

The challenge before the *Ummah* today is to restore *Dār al-Islām* (Islamic Public Order) and the institution of *Khilāfah*. Even though our Islamic eschatological view is that the *Khilāfah* cannot be restored until the advent of *Imām al-Mahdi*, it nevertheless remains obligatory for Muslims to persist with that effort. As a consequence it is imperative that Muslims be taught the history of the incremental collapse of the *Khilāfah* State and its eventual replacement in the heartland of Islām by the secular *Saūdi-Wahhābi* nation-State. It is even more important that Muslims understand the highly devious role that the Ottoman Empire played in that collapse since we are about to witness an effort directed towards the revival of the Ottoman Empire. This book is meant to contribute towards that effort of public education.

## **From destruction of the Khilāfah state to destruction of the Hajj**

This study is of even more strategic importance because the enemies who destroyed the *Khilāfah* now have their eyes trained on the *Hajj* – a religious institution which has functioned uninterrupted since it was first established by the Nabi Ibrahīm (i.e., Prophet

Abraham (‘alaihi al-Salām) thousands of years ago. The *Hajj* continued even when Arabia had embraced idolatry. The enemies of Islām now have as one of their supreme long-term objectives, the destruction of the *Hajj*.

Abū Saīd al-Khudri has narrated a *Hadīth* of the Prophet (sallallahu ‘alaihi wa sallam) in which he, the Prophet, declared that:

قال صلى الله عليه وسلم "ليحجن هذا البيت،  
وليعتمرن بعد خروج يأجوج ومأجوج" ..... "لا  
تقوم الساعة حتى لا يحج البيت".

“The people will continue to perform the Hajj and Umrah to the Ka’aba even after the appearance of Y’ajūj (Gog) and M’ajūj (Magog).” Shu’ba narrated, in addition: The (last) hour will not be established until the Hajj to the Ka’aba is abandoned.”

(Sahīh Bukhāri)

Our study of the subject has led us to conclude that the goal of stopping the *Hajj* is now within the grasp of the enemies of Islām. All that is required for that goal to be achieved is for Israel to launch a series of brazen new wars of aggression on Arabs and Muslims, or that *Masjid al-Aqsā* be destroyed. The Jewish State of Israel can do

that at anytime. It is just a matter of choosing the opportune moment. The present Saūdi regime has betrayed the world of Islām to such an extent that it is now in a strategic alliance with the Zionists as well as with the State of Israel. The new brazen Zionist wars and/or the destruction of *Masjid al-Aqsā* will provoke greater internal and external opposition to the Saūdi regime. The regime will not be able to control the rage that Muslims will express at the time of the *Hajj* - hence presenting opportunity for the internal opposition within Saūdi Arabia to put the *Hajj* to effective use in destabilizing the regime. This is the scenario that will most likely lead the Saūdis to stop the *Hajj* in order to preserve their rule.

If the world of Islām were to lose the *Hajj*, after having lost the *Khilāfah*, it would constitute yet another massive step back to the *Jāhiliyyah* of *pre-Hijri* Makkah. Our security predicament will become just as precarious as it was in *pre-Hijri* Makkah. Only the strongest possible *Imān* will survive that terrible test! What can we do about it? The first step that must be taken in any possible counter-strategy must be to launch a struggle for recovering the *Khilāfah* and *Dār al-Islām*, and hence the need for a critical study of the history of that period

wherein the *Khilāfah* and *Dār al-Islām* were lost. This is what we attempt to do - albeit briefly - in this book.





## CHAPTER ONE

*“If Western civilization was ever to succeed in finally defeating and controlling Islām, and in incorporating the entire world of Islām into the new secular international order that had been established by the West, the strategy required that Hejāz should be controlled by proxy by Western Judeo-Christian civilization in order that the remnant of Islam’s Khilāfah State that was established and sustained in Constantinople for several centuries, might be weakened and eventually eliminated. The control over the Hejāz had to be by proxy rather than by direct western colonization since Dajjāl knew that Muslims would rise up as a united fighting force to liberate Makkah and Madina from the control of Kuffār. But control by proxy was actually synonymous with actual control – and the blessed Prophet had already been forewarned that Dajjāl would succeed in establishing his control over Makkah and the Hajj in Ākhir al-Zamān. After all, did the Prophet (sallallahu ‘alaihi was sallam) not declare that he had a vision in which he saw Dajjāl making Tawāf around the Ka’aba?”*

## *British diplomacy and the attack on the Khilāfah*

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So long as the *Khilāfah* State survived it would always remain a potential threat to the West, a powerful symbol of the theo-centric Islamic Public Order or *Pax Islamica*, and a rallying point through which the world of Islām could always be mobilized into a potent fighting force. There was an inseparable link between “power” and the *Khilāfah* State in Islām!

The office of the *Khilāfah* functioned as the ultimate symbol of Islām as a dominant force in public life. There was, however, a permanent link between the *Khilāfah* and control over the *Hejāz* (in particular the *Haramain*, i.e., the sacred territories in the *Hejāzi* cities of Makkah and Madina). A *Khalīfah* had to establish and maintain control the *Hajj* which was one of the five pillars of the religion of Islām, and since the *Hajj* took place in the *Hejāz*, he had to consequently control the *Hejāz*. Anyone who could succeed in severing that link between the Office of the *Khilāfah* on the one hand and control over the *Hajj* and the *Hejāz* on the other, could cripple the institution of the *Khilāfah* and eventually render the world of Islām powerless!

Throughout the 1400 years of the history of the *Ummah* of the Prophet Muhammad (sallallahu ‘alaihi wa sallam), no one was ever successfully appointed to the *Khilāfah*, and has had his appointment universally legitimized by the *Bai’ah*, or oath of allegiance of the Muslims, without such a person having had either actual control, or the capacity to exercise control, over the *Hejāz* in general and the *Haramain* in particular. Thus the historical record as well, established an inseparable link in the religio-political consciousness of the *Ummah* between the office of the *Khalīfah* on the one hand, and authority over the *Hejāz* and the *Haramain* on the other.

This inseparable link had a foundation in the *Shari’ah* in so far as the *Hajj* was an institution equally binding on all the members of the *Ummah*, and *Hajj* involved physical travel to the *Hejāz*. No one therefore, could be recognized to be the supreme leader of the Muslims who did not have the authority and the means of exercising responsibility for the organization and administration of the *Hajj*. And this, of course, included freedom and security for the pilgrims and, hence, required control over the *Hejāz*. As a consequence, even when the seat of the *Khilāfah* was shifted from the *Hejāz* to Kufa (Iraq), Damascus, Baghdad and Cairo, the

*Khulafā* (i.e., Caliphs) always strove to maintain their authority and control over the *Hejāz*.

The first major step taken in the strategy to destroy the institution of the *Khilāfah* was to create of a *Khilāfah* State that was located outside of the Arab world. The second, easier step was to sever that non-Arab *Khilāfah* State's control over the *Haramain* and the *Hajj* and thus deliver a fatal blow to its legitimacy.

The Ottoman Turks were chosen to function as the witting or unwitting hosts of precisely such a *Khilāfah* State that would be located, for the first time in the history of Islam, outside of the Arab world. In fact the Zionists killed 'two birds with one stone' when that non-Arab *Khilāfah* State was established in the very capital city of Constantinople. The Zionist Judeo-Christian alliance was confined to western European Christians and did not include those Christians who were described as *Rūm* and who were sympathetically and positively recognized in the Qur'ān. Indeed an entire *Sūrah* of the Qur'ān was named after such Christians, i.e., *Sūrah al-Rūm*. Constantinople was the capital city of *Rūm*.

Ottoman Turks controlled the *Haramain* and *Hajj* uninterruptedly for centuries until the Zionists succeeded in the First World-War in severing that

control and in thus delivering a fatal blow to the legitimacy of the Ottoman *Khilāfah*. Not only did the Ottoman *Khilāfah* perish, but the Ottoman *Khilāfah* State also perished.

All that now remained in the Zionist plan for the destruction of Islam's *Khilāfah* State was to ensure that no successor *Khilāfah* State could emerge, in succession to the Ottoman *Khilāfah* State. The Saudi-Wahhabi alliance emerged in history to perform precisely this function on behalf of the Zionists. No one could ever successfully claim the *Khilāfah* so long as the Saudi-Wahhabis controlled the *Haramain* and *Hajj*.

*Dajjāl* the false Messiah and the forces of Zionism had paid very careful attention to the study and understanding of the link between the *Khilāfah*, the power of Islām as a world-wide force, and control over the *Haramain*, and they had planned their diabolical strategy to render Islām powerless, and to confine it to private faith with no authority over public life. In fact they had planned their strategy to secularize Islām and in doing so to imprison Muslims politically and economically while transforming them into carbon copies of the godless European way of life.

If Western civilization was ever to succeed in finally defeating and controlling Islām, and in incorporating the entire world of Islām into the new secular international order that had been established by the West, the strategy required that *Hejāz* should be controlled by proxy by Western Judeo-Christian civilization. The control had to be by proxy rather than by direct western colonization of the *Hejāz* since *Dajjāl* knew that Muslims would rise up as a united fighting force to liberate Makkah and Madina from the control of *Kuffār*. But control by proxy was actually synonymous with actual control – and the Prophet’s prophecy was that he (*Dajjāl*) would succeed in establishing his control over Makkah and the *Hajj* in *Ākhir al-Zamān*. After all, did the Prophet (sallallahu ‘alaihi was sallam) not declare that he had a vision in which he saw *Dajjāl* making *Tawāf* around the *Ka’aba*?

The British, realizing the paramount importance of the *Hejāz* and the *Haramain* for the legitimacy and even survival of the Ottoman *Khilāfah*, concentrated their diplomacy in the First World-War on wresting the *Hejāz* from the control of the Ottoman *Khalīfah*. This was achieved in the first Zionist-crafted ‘Arab Spring’ when *Sharīf* Husain, the Ottoman-appointed *Sharīf* of Makkah

and great grandfather of the late King Husain of Jordan (who was replaced by his son Abdullah), was successfully induced by the British to rebel against the Ottoman *Khalīfah* and to establish his own authority over the *Hejāz* under benign British alliance and protection.

By 1916, and in the very midst of the First World-War, the Ottoman *Khalīfah* had lost control over Makkah and Jeddah, i.e., the lower *Hejāz*. His control over Madina was maintained throughout the war and only came to an end in 1919 when certain Ottoman troops within the city of Madina were induced to rebel against their heroic leader, Fakhri Pasha.<sup>1</sup> After the Ottoman *Khalīfah* had lost control over the *Hejāz*, the *Khilāfah* was so crippled that it lingered on in Constantinople for a few more years before it collapsed completely. And this was a truly outstanding success for British diplomacy. The weakening of the *Khilāfah* destabilized the entire structure of the Ottoman Islamic Empire. It eventually collapsed. In 1919 British troops, under the leadership of General Allenby, captured Jerusalem. It is

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<sup>1</sup> Elie Kedourie, in a chapter entitled "The Fall of Madina - January 1919" (Islam in the Modern World, Holt Rinehart and Winston, NY. 1980 pp 277-96) provides a vivid description and excellent analysis of the heroic defense of Madina by the Ottoman Commander, Fakhri Pasha, until January 1919 when he was betrayed by some of his troops.

significant that Allenby, upon entering the Holy City, proclaimed that “*the crusades are now finally over*”. If there was any doubt whatsoever of the extreme danger to Islām posed by British diplomacy in the Arabian Peninsula, this statement of Allenby should have put those doubts to rest.

What Allenby meant was that Islām was now a tiger without teeth. Its fate was to remain permanently powerless and, therefore, incapable of responding to the loss of Jerusalem in the manner in which Salahuddin Ayyubi (Saladin) had responded when Jerusalem was lost to the Crusaders.

Arabs had fought with Allenby to wrest Jerusalem from the rule of the Ottoman *Khalīfah*. They were now waiting to ravage the carcass left by the British victory over Constantinople. The ‘Arab Spring’ was crafted to get them to covet local rule over the *Hejāz* and an Arab *Khilāfah* over a unified Arab world, and so they waited to see whether the Ottoman *Khalīfah* would ever be able to regain the strength necessary to seek to re-impose his rule over the *Hejāz*.

When, on March 3, 1924, the Ottoman *Khilāfah* was abolished, it became clear that no such threat existed. And it was precisely on that day that the clients

of Britain began their fight over the carcass left by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

On March 7, 1924, *Sharīf* al-Husain pre-emptively claimed the *Khilāfah* for himself. His most important credential was that he exercised *de facto* control over the *Hejāz*. He also boasted of being *Hashimite* i.e., belonging to the same clan - *Banū Hāshim*, of the tribe of the Quraish to which the Prophet himself belonged. In fact this weighed so heavily amongst the *Ulamā* that the Chief *Qadi* of Transjordan promptly accepted the claim and recognized Husain as *Khalīfah*.

His other credential, which was of dubious value amongst the Muslim masses, but which weighed heavily in the power-politics of the peninsula, was that the *Sharīf* was an ally of Britain, the super-power of the day, and had received considerable financial, diplomatic and military support from Britain in his successful rebellion against Ottoman authority in the *Hejāz*.

In claiming the *Khilāfah* for himself *Sharīf* Husain committed the monstrous blunder of not first seeking the permission of the British to act as he did. It is the essence of the client-State status that freedom is effectively curtailed. *Sharīf* Husain had violated the basic

rule of conduct for client-States. How would the British react?

British diplomacy in *Jaziratul 'Arab* (i.e., the Arabian Peninsula) was multi-dimensional and yet integrated. There was, first of all, the objective of wresting control of the *Haramain* from the *Khalīfah* in Constantinople. This was meant to weaken his legitimacy, and thus his influence over the rest of the world of Islām, and so facilitate the defeat of the Ottomans in the World-War. Secondly Britain wanted a friendly regime (i.e., as friendly to Britain as the Ottomans had been for almost all of their history) in control of the *Hejāz* so that the British could better be able to manipulate the politics of the peninsula. Finally, the politics of the peninsula and the establishment of a successor regime in the *Hejāz* to the Ottomans were strategically linked to Zionism's efforts to build a diabolical consensus with Britain in the pursuit of the creation of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. This integrated diplomacy finally bore spectacular fruit with the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 and the Balfour Declaration of 1917.

The super-power of the day and the so-called *chosen people* were visibly locked in an embrace of truly

momentous consequences for them and for the rest of mankind.

The objective of the integrated diplomacy was to dismantle the entire Islamic Public Order so as to render Islām powerless to prevent Zionism from achieving its goal. Already the Islamic institutions integrally related to the Islamic Public Order, *Ahl al-Dhimmah* and *al-Jizyah*,<sup>2</sup> had been abolished in the Ottoman Islamic Empire in 1855 as a direct consequence of European Zionist pressure. But so long as the institution of the *Khilāfah* remained it was always possible for the Islamic Public Order to linger on and, eventually, be revived. The attack on the institution of the *Khilāfah* was therefore vitally necessary if the ultimate Euro-Jewish goal was ever to be achieved.

It was also quite clear to the British and the Zionists that a Jewish National Home - the Jewish State of Israel, could not be established in Muslim Palestine, and could never hope to survive, so long as the world of Islām had

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<sup>2</sup> *Ahl al-Dhimmah* are a protected non-Muslim people permitted to reside in *Dār al-Islām*. *Jizyah* is a punitive tax imposed by the Qurʾān upon a people who were defeated in Jihād, and who wished to continue to reside in their former territory. Payment of the punitive tax is meant to symbolize their submission to the rule of Islām in that territory.

a *Khalīfah* capable of mobilizing its formidable resources and religious fervor and directing it to military ends. And so the control over the *Hejāz*, which was of paramount importance in the politics of the peninsula, was a matter to which British diplomacy directed supreme attention.

But the claim to the *Khilāfah* by the Hashimite, Sharīf al-Husain, was incompatible with British diplomatic objectives because it was always possible that the claim could have succeeded. Sharīf al-Husain could then have mobilized the world of Islām to such an extent as to re-establish the Islamic Public Order and *Pax Islamica* in the symbolically powerful heartland of Islām, and so pose a threat to Britain's influence and control over large parts of *Dār al-Islām*. A revitalized world of Islām would also have made Jewish control over Palestine and Jerusalem quite impossible. Israel would never be created.

And so Britain gave her blessings to the other British client in the peninsula, 'Abd al-'Azīz Ibn Saūd, to move against Husain and to wrest control of the *Hejāz* from him. This was the perfection of the art of double-crossing and of hypocrisy. One client was used to eliminate another client. The same fate now awaited both Husain and the Ottomans. The lesson was clear,

that *Dajjāl* used clients until he had no further use for them, and he then discarded them and replaced them with new clients. (This is quite similar to the anointing of US Presidents – both Democrats and republicans - who succeed one another while all faithfully serving *Dajjāl*. Whoever stepped out of line would be assassinated by the Israeli Mossad)

Britain had cultivated Ibn Saūd's friendship and alliance during the war and, as usual, had employed financial diplomacy (i.e., bribery) to sweeten the deal. Ibn Saūd received a monthly sum of 5000 pounds sterling from the British Treasury in return for his benevolent neutrality in Husain's rebellion against the *Khalīfah*, the imposition of Hashimite rule over the *Hejāz*, and Britain's diplomatic and military efforts in the peninsula directed against the Ottoman Islamic State. In fact, he had become Britain's client. He diabolically rationalized this manifest violation of the command of Allah Most High and His Prophet by explaining away the bribe as *Jizyah*.<sup>3</sup> But British diplomacy in respect of Ibn

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<sup>3</sup> "Oh you who believe (in this Qur'ān), do not take (such) Jews and (such) Christians as your friends and allies who, themselves, are friends and allies of each other. (i.e., do not enter into a relationship of friendship and alliance with the Zionist Judeo-Christian alliance). And whoever amongst you turn to them for friendship and alliance

Saūd was directed to ends of far greater strategic importance than mere benevolent neutrality in the war and the disposal of the injudicious *Sharīf* Husain. Ibn Saūd had a far greater potential that Britain now moved to exploit, consequent on Sharīf Husain's claim to the *Khilāfah*.

The Saūdi power in the *Nejd*, which had re-emerged with the capture of *Riyādh* in 1902, was the product of an old alliance between a tribal chief and the religious leader of the puritanical *Wahhābi* religious sect whose religious profile could best be described as *Protestant Islām*. That alliance ensured that while the descendants of the tribal chief wielded political power over territory ruled by the alliance, religious affairs would be subject to the authority of the descendants of the religious chief. As a consequence it was inevitable that the *Najdi Saūdis* would be under pressure from the *Wahhābis* to seek to force the submission of the heart-land of Islām (the *Hejāz*) to the *Wahhābi* perception of the true faith.

Britain was only too pleased to give permission to her British client, Ibn Saūd, to move his *Wahhābi* forces against the other British client, Husain bin Ali. Ibn Saūd

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now belong to them (i.e., you have lost your Islam). Surely Allah does not Guide the wicked. (Qur'ān, al-Māidah, 5:51)

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did so just four days after the Hashemite had claimed the *Khilāfah* for himself. Ibn Saūd was impatient to move against Husain since, as strange as it may appear, both Jewish control over Jerusalem and *Wahhābi* control over *Hejāz* faced a similar threat. *Neither could be achieved, or could hope to survive, if the world of Islām was united under the leadership of a Khalīfah.*

By supporting Ibn Saūd, the British were now ensuring that so long as the *Saūdi-Wahhābis* ruled over the *Hejāz*, the *Khilāfah* could never be revived. The British further calculated that without the *Khilāfah* the Islamic Public Order could not survive and the world of Islām would then be so weakened that it could never be mobilized to prevent the creation of the Jewish State of Israel. Britain also knew that the *Wahhābis* could never themselves claim the *Khilāfah* since a *Wahhābi/Salafi Khalīfah* would always be totally unacceptable to the overwhelming majority of Muslims the world over. And so, by withdrawing support from Husain and supporting Ibn Saūd, Britain was in fact pursuing her relentless attack on the institution of the *Khilāfah* and the theocentric Islamic Public Order.

Within a few months Ibn Saūd was able to conquer Makkah, and Husain fled to Jeddah. The British

eventually intervened to remove him physically from the peninsula by offering him a comfortable exile in Cyprus. (Today's exile for pro-American politicians and Generals in the Armed Forces in the Muslim world is usually to Miami and Los Angeles.) Soon after this Madina and Jeddah were also subjected to *Saūdi-Wahhābi* rule.

More than a century earlier, however, the *Saūdi-Wahhābi* alliance had succeeded in overcoming the defenses of Tāif and Makkah and there ensued a blood-bath of truly astonishing proportions. The *Wahhābis*, in their fanatical zeal, considered the Muslims resident in the *Hejāz* to be *Mushriqūn* (i.e., a people guilty of the crime of blasphemy) and, as a consequence, held that it was permissible to kill them, and they proceeded to slaughter innocent Muslims with a ruthlessness and abandon never before witnessed in Islamic history. As we write, *Dajjāl's* warriors have reemerged to do the very same thing in Libya, and are repeating it in Syria. The very same theological reasoning may explain the ruthlessness and abandon with which their latter-day successors (*Dajjāl's* warriors) recently killed so many innocent people in Libya, and are now killing, with abandon, so many innocent people in Syria in their

effort to win these territories as well for *Dajjāl*. It appears that Pakistan and Algeria await the same fate.

At that time of the great Wahhabi blood-bath, the *Khalīfah* in Constantinople got the Mamluke Khedive of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, to send an army to the *Hejāz* under the leadership of his son Ismail. *Dajjāl's Saūdi-Wahhābi* warriors were unceremoniously driven out of *Hejāz* and into the desert. A century later, however, there was no *Khalīfah* and all the powerful Muslim communities were under western colonial rule. In addition, Ibn Saūd enjoyed the protecting friendship of Great Britain, the super-power of the day. There was, therefore, no immediate possibility whatsoever of dislodging *Dajjāl's Saūdi-Wahhābi* warriors from the *Haramain* and *Hejāz*.

Although Ibn Saūd was safely in control of *Hejāz*, he was still confronted with a truly formidable problem at the commencement of his rule over the *Hejāz* in 1924. Namely, he had to devise some strategy that could avert the long-term possibility of a repetition of the disaster that visited the previous *Saūdi-Wahhābi* rule over the *Hejāz*. It would appear that he first thought of a policy of conciliation with non-*Wahhābi* Muslims and of using his control over the *Hejāz* to further the cause of the unity

of the *Ummah*. Thus shortly after gaining control over Makkah and receiving from its inhabitants their recognition of him as *Sultān* of the *Hejāz*, he issued a proclamation to the entire world of Islām to the effect that the *Hejāz*, with its *Haramain*, belonged to the entire world of Islām and that he, Ibn Saūd, held control over the *Hejāz* as (only) a trust, and on behalf of the entire world of Islām.<sup>4</sup> He then went on to invite the entire world of Islām to send its representatives to Makkah so that, on the basis of *Shūrah* (consultation) and *Ijma'a* (consensus), a just, efficient and representative administration could be established over the *Hejāz*.

This important announcement was entirely consistent with the provisions of the Islamic Public Order. The *Hejāz* was still the *Dār al-Islām* that had been established by the Prophet. As yet there was no hint of any Saūdi State that would claim “territorial sovereignty” over the *Hejāz*. The rights of the Muslims in the territory of *Dār al-Islām* were being publicly recognized and respected. But unfortunately this concern for the unity of the world of Islām and this fervent declaration concerning the status of the *Hejāz* did not represent the actual *Saūdi-Wahhābi* designs over

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<sup>4</sup> Toynbee Ed., Survey of International Affairs, 1925.

the *Hejāz*. It was simply a case of *politics of expediency* and was deceptively designed to protect the *Saūdi-Wahhābis* in the wake of a significant initiative undertaken by *Al-Azhar* University in Cairo shortly after the abolition of the Ottoman *Khilāfah*.

Indeed *al-Azhar's* initiative had perilous implications for Ibn Saūd and the *Saūdi-Wahhābi* rule over the *Hejāz*. It also constituted a troublesome 'fly in the ointment' for the victorious Zionists and British. *Al-Azhar* proposed to convene an International Islamic *Khilāfah* Congress (*Mu'tamar al-Khilāfah*) in Cairo which would, among other things, attempt to appoint a new *Khalīfah* over the world of Islām.

Had the *Wahhābi* sect been genuinely devoted to Islām they would have welcomed this *al-Azhar* effort to achieve conformity with an essential requirement of the *Shari'ah*, i.e., the establishment of a genuine *Khilāfah*. The *Wahhābis* had long argued that the post-*Rashidūn* *Khilāfah* was invalid because, among other things, the *Khilāfah* was not constituted in a manner that conformed with the requirements of the *Shari'ah*. Now that the invalid *Khilāfah* had been abolished and the leading center of Islamic learning was convening an international Islamic congress to discuss the question of

the *Khilāfah* and to appoint a new *Khalīfah*, the *Wahhābis* should not only have welcomed this initiative but should also have extended every possible cooperation and should have participated in a serious way in the Congress in order to ensure that the genuine *Khilāfah* was restored. But the *Wahhābis* had no such sincere devotion to Islām. Their attitude was essentially one of selective religiosity, expediency, opportunism and parochialism. *Indeed the evidence of this is so painfully clear that for almost 100 years since the abolition of the Ottoman Khilāfah in 1924 and the imposition of Saūdi-Wahhābi rule over Makkah in the same year, the Wahhābi/Salafis have never made any attempt to restore the Islamic Khilāfah in the Hejaz.* This writer fears that the only time they would ever do so is when *Dajjāl* wants a bogeyman of a possible restoration of the Islamic *Khilāfah* or an actual claim of a restored *Khilāfah* so that the Zionists can exploit such as *causus bellum* to justify great wars on the Arabs in particular.

*Wahhābi* Islām knew that the world of Islām would never have accepted a *Wahhābi Khalīfah* and, as a consequence, the *Wahhābis* found it expedient to repudiate an essential requirement of the Islamic Public Order. They marshaled all their energies to sabotage the

Cairo *Khilāfah* Congress. Their strategy was to organize a rival congress in Makkah at the time of the *Hajj* of 1926. That meant that the Makkah Congress would take place within a month of Cairo Congress, making it difficult for delegates to attend both conferences (since there was no air travel at that time). Since the Makkah Conference was timed to coincide with the annual *Hajj*, and since it had the active support of the British, it had a clear advantage over the Cairo Conference.

Secondly, they specifically excluded from the agenda of the Makkah Congress the question of the *Khilāfah*. This transparent attempt to sabotage the Cairo Conference and to bury the *Khilāfah* was more than ample evidence to expose the hollow credentials of the *Wahhābis* as so-called champions of the *Shari'ah* and of Islām.

The response of the world of Islām to this rivalry, i.e., between the Cairo *Khilāfah* Congress of May/June 1926 and the rival Makkah World Muslim Congress of July 1926, is a subject that deserves serious research. How much British diplomacy was involved in ensuring, for example, that the important Muslim community of India, which had supported the Ottoman *Khilāfah* to such an extent that they had established the formidable

*Khilāfah* Movement, would mysteriously stay away from the *Khilāfah* Congress of Cairo and, instead, attend the rival Makkah Conference from the agenda of which the question of the *Khilāfah* was specifically excluded? Very little research has been done on this subject.

What was clear, however, was that in this rivalry the Makkah Conference achieved a tactical victory over Cairo, a victory that had enormous implications for the very survival of the institution of the *Khilāfah* and the orthodox Islamic Public Order (i.e., *Dār al-Islām*). Those who organized the Cairo Congress wished to ensure conformity with the orthodox Islamic system of political organization. But they were not only intellectually incapable of articulating a conception of the Islamic Public Order (*Dār al-Islām*) and the Islamic Conception of an International Order that could convince a skeptical world of Islām but, more importantly, they had no political power since Britain was the *de facto* ruler over Egypt.

Those who organized the Makkah Congress, on the other hand, were unwilling, because of vested interests, to remain faithful to the orthodox Islamic Public Order with its *Khilāfah*, *Dār al-Islām* etc. Instead they chose to accept the rival system of political organization which

had emerged in modern western civilization and which had just penetrated the very seat of the Ottoman *Khilāfah*, namely the secular nation-State system. And they did so because it was only in the nation-State system that the *Saūdi-Wahhābis* could realistically pursue an effort to win recognition and legitimacy for their rule over the *Hejāz*. They also knew very well that any effort on their part to restore the Islamic *Khilāfah* State would result in a hostile British response that would threaten the survival of a soon-to-be-established usurper *Saūdi-Wahhābi* State. And so they camouflaged their true designs and made an elaborate attempt to dupe the world of Islām, and their success in this game of deception was amply demonstrated in the representative character of the Makkah Conference of July 1926.

The tactical victory of the Makkah Conference in its rivalry with the Cairo Congress played a significant role in paving the way for the rest of the world of Islām, including the very heart-land of Islām, to eventually follow the example of Mustafa Kamal and his model of the secular State of Turkey. The history of the world of Islām since 1924 records, on the one hand, the evils which were continuously injected into the body of the

*Ummah* through this alien system of political organization and, on the other, the naive, confused and superficial attempts of modern Islamic *revivalist* scholarship and secular Muslim political leaders to construct an entirely bogus and fraudulent secular so-called Islamic nation-State system that would eventually be presented to the Muslim world as an adequate substitute for the Islamic *Khilāfah*.

The Islamic theoretical justification for this hybrid substitute for the Islamic *Khilāfah* State was presented as Islamization of the secular State to transform it into an Islamic State; and that Islamic State could then somehow be accommodated within the system of nation-States. But both of these were futile goals for it was, and still is, impossible for them to be achieved without first dismantling some of the essential apparatus of the nation-State, essential, that is, for its survival as a secular institution.

Dr Muhammad Iqbāl and his political protégé *Maulānā* Abul ‘Alā Maudūdī (rahimahumullah) in India, as well as scholars and political activists such as Hassan al-Banna in Egypt, ventured into *Ijtihād* (i.e., independent reasoning) to reconstruct an Islamic Public Order in post-*Khilāfah* Islām. Their efforts resulted in the unique and

novel concept of the *Islamic State*. Unfortunately, however, the efforts for establishing the *Islamic State* resulted in the orthodox Islamic system of the political organization of the *Ummah* or the Islamic Public Order (i.e., *Pax Islamica* and *Dār al-Islām*) being relegated to total obscurity. As a consequence political thought in the world of Islām was gravely misdirected, and the immense confusion so created persists to the present day in which, around the world of Islām, the Islamic movements register themselves as political parties under the secular constitutions of the modern State and then fight elections in order to win power and thus assume control over government. The evidence is now clear that the only time they ever succeed in assuming control over government in a secular nation-State system is when they agree to be clients of the Zionists.

When the Zionists decided, for example, that Libya and Syria needed regime change since the Libyan and Syrian leaders were ‘bloody dictators’ who were ‘killing’ their own people who had risen up against them and their ‘oppressive regimes’, it was obligatory on Zionist clients who had risen to power through Islamic electoral victory to support the Zionist call for regime change.



## CHAPTER TWO

*“Among Britain’s major political and military goals in the war were the subjugation of Islām as a power in the world, the conquest of Jerusalem, and the creation in Palestine of a Jewish homeland that would constantly disrupt and police the Muslim Middle East on behalf of the West. The Jewish-Zionist leaders had, of course, another goal. They wanted to create a State of Israel in a liberated Holy Land which would be presented to orthodox non-European Jews as the restored Holy State of Israel of David and Solomon (peace and blessings of Allah Most High be upon them both). Their ultimate goal was for that Israel to become the ruling State in the world and thus permit Dajjāl to make a credible claim to be the true Messiah.”*

*The collapse of the Ottoman  
Khilāfah and the rise of the secular  
Saūdi-Wahhābi nation-state*

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**The First World-War and the Abolition of the  
Ottoman *Khilāfah***

In so far as the Muslim World was concerned the first World-War was much more than a mere European war. It was, rather, a war which brought about upheavals and changes in the Muslim World which were unprecedented in its thirteen hundred years of existence.

Firstly, the greatest Muslim power and seat of the contemporary *Khilāfah*, the Ottoman Islamic Empire, entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. While this decision is still clouded in some controversy since, up to the very last moment, the Ottoman leadership was reluctant to enter the war and was undecided which side to support in the war, it should be clear that the Zionist Anglo-French alliance had craftily created a strategic environment in which the Ottoman Empire was left with no option other than enter the war on the side of Germany rather than the side of the

traditional Ottoman allies – namely Britain and France. The Anglo-French alliance with Russia that was concluded in 1907 created precisely that strategic environment which sealed the fate of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, that was the reason for which Britain and France embraced Russia. They sealed the embrace with a secret agreement that when the alliance reaped the fruit it desired, Russia would get Constantinople. With typical Anglo-American deception they devised, at that very time, a plan to bring about such regime-change in Russia (i.e., the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917) as would deprive Russia of the prize of Constantinople that she coveted.

The Ottoman war-time leader Mehmed Talaat Pasha was candid in his confirmation of that Ottoman predicament when he wrote his 1921 memoirs (published post-humously). It is a remarkably candid document which gives the reader a vivid description of the Zionist-crafted strategic environment which prepared the way for the First World War (see Appendix 1).

Among Britain's major political and military goals in the war were the subjugation of Islām as a power in the world, the conquest of Jerusalem, and the creation in

Palestine of a Jewish homeland that would constantly disrupt and police the Muslim Middle East on behalf of the West. The Jewish-Zionist leaders had, of course, another goal. They wanted to create a State of Israel in a liberated Holy Land which would be presented to orthodox non-European Jews as Holy Israel of David and Solomon (peace and blessings of Allah Most High be upon them both). Their ultimate goal was for that Israel to become the ruling State in the world and thus permit *Dajjāl* to make a credible claim to be the true Messiah.

Ottoman entry into the First World-War in alliance with Germany was an essential requirement for the successful realization of Zionist goals. They had made a number of unsuccessful efforts at striking a deal with the Ottoman *Khalifah* for Jewish control over Jerusalem. They even offered to buy the holy city. The Ottomans consistently refused to make such a deal and, as a consequence, it became necessary to take Jerusalem from them by force of arms. Secondly, in order to prevent the Ottoman's from ever regrouping with other Muslims to recover Jerusalem, it was necessary to break up the Ottoman Empire and to place the Turkish homeland under a rule that would discard all Turkish Muslim attachment to Jerusalem.

The Ottoman leadership predictably attempted to mobilize support for its war effort from the entire Muslim world. In this connection, the *Shaikh al-Islām* of the Ottoman Islamic State issued a *Fatwa* and a proclamation on November 23<sup>rd</sup> 1914 declaring *Jihād* and commanding all Muslims to fight against the Allied Powers (Text of Fatwa can be found at Appendix 2). British diplomacy, however, succeeded through the first ‘Arab Spring’ in promoting and exploiting Arab nationalism in the Arabian Peninsula as an effective means of attacking and undermining the formidable strength of universal Islamic fraternity. As a consequence the Arabs rebelled against Ottoman rule on the basis of a British offer of assistance to achieve national independence. This first ‘Arab Spring’, like its successor a hundred years later, revealed a pliable Arab world that could be successfully manipulated by the Zionists.

In less than two years after the commencement of the war Sharīf al-Husain, self-styled ‘King of the Arabs’, firm ally of the British, and great-grandfather of Jordan’s late King Husain, had successfully rebelled against the Ottoman authority and was installed as King of the *Hejāz*, the heart-land of Islām. And as a consequence of

the loss of the cities of Makkah and, eventually, Madina, the pan-Islamic appeal of the Ottoman *Khalīfah* suffered irreparable damage.

The British followed up their success in the *Hejāz* by installing the sons of Husain as Kings in Iraq and Transjordan as well. And by 1919 the British General, Allenby, with Arab troops fighting loyally with him, marched triumphantly into Jerusalem and declared that the crusades had finally come to an end. Palestine remained a British Mandate territory (mandated by the League of Nations) until the British withdrew in 1948 and the Zionist Jews declared the establishment of the State of Israel.

The first 'Arab Spring' achieved its objective of facilitating the simultaneous birth of the State of Israel and (as explained earlier) the Saudi-Wahhabi take-over of the *Hejaz*, *Haramain* and *Hajj*.

The second 'Arab Spring', which is still underway as these lines are being written, is meant to so further extend the successes of the first 'Arab Spring' as to also embrace and de-nuclearize nuclear-armed Pakistan, and thus facilitate Israel's rise to the status of *ruling State* in the world.

The Ottoman Islamic Empire was badly defeated in the war. The Allied Powers combined their military prowess with a psychological weapon that had far-reaching effects for Islām. The British and French succeeded in winning Muslim military forces (by means more foul than fair) from India, the Maghrib and other areas, in consequence of which both Arab and non-Arab Muslims fought against their brother Muslim Turks. The result was that the Ottoman Islamic Empire was not only defeated, but its universal Islamic foundations were destroyed.

Secular Turkish nationalist forces, led by Mustafa Kamal, emerged out of the ashes of Ottoman defeat in the first World-War and fought a 'war after the war' with such courage, brilliance and determination that the *conveniently* war-weary western Christian European powers who were *conveniently* restrained from intervening by their own domestic public opinion, could do nothing to prevent the Turks from inflicting a crushing defeat on the eastern orthodox Christian Greeks (i.e., *Rūm* of the Qur'ān) and in winning secular Turkish freedom. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1924, gave international recognition to that which had been spectacularly won by secular Turkish arms on the

battlefield. The anointing of Mustafa Kamal, the new secular Turkish hero, was now complete. *Dajjāl's* victory was both complete and perfect!

## **The Turkish Nationalists and the *Khilāfah***

The secular Turkish nationalist forces had been in constant conflict with the *Sultān-Khalīfah* for more than fifty years, struggling to limit his powers through a constitutional order which would replace what they considered to be an autocratic religious dictatorship. The Turkish nationalist forces were essentially secular in their political outlook and were deeply impressed by what they perceived to be the evident superiority of Western civilization over the Ottoman *Khilāfah* and Ottoman Islamic Empire.

In the wake of the loss of the cities of Makkah and Madina, and after brother-Muslims had fought against them in the war, the secular Turkish leadership now felt themselves free from any impelling attachment to the world of Islām, and they moved swiftly to transform their political order from the old model of *Dār al-Islām*, or the Islamic Public Order, to the western model of a modern secular nation-State, the Republic of Turkey.

In such a transformation it was, and still is, inevitable that there should be some form of separation of 'religion' from 'politics' or 'church' from 'state' - for this was the very foundation of the western model.<sup>5</sup> Unless such a separation was realized it would not be possible to secularize the State. The new Turkish Grand National Assembly, faithful to the new model it was introducing, appointed Abdul Magīd as *Khalīfah* in 1922 to serve as head of the Islamic 'Church'. His *Khilāfah*, however, was shorn of all temporal power. These were vested in the State.

It was just as inevitable that the new model should break down in the Islamic *milieu* of Turkey. It was not, and still is not, possible to do with Islām, what the Europeans had done with Christianity after the break-up of the Holy Roman Empire. The *Khalīfah* was not, and could not be, the equivalent of the Pope.<sup>6</sup> There could be no accommodation of political secularism in the

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<sup>5</sup> Cf. Bey, Rustom: "The Future of Islamism", *The 19th Century and After*, Vol.xcxii, No 580 June 1925, pp 845-54, where the liberal Turkish thinker argues the point in a well-reasoned article.

<sup>6</sup> For an interesting discussion on the subject see Toynbee, Ed. *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, Vol 1 pp 51-68, especially p 55. See also concluding chapter of Sylvia Haim in Arnold, T: *The Caliphate*; revised ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 1965. Pp, 205-44.

Islamic system since orthodox Islām recognized no division between the Church and the State. Indeed there was no such thing as an Islamic ‘Church’.

It quickly became evident that the new model of a modern nation-State could not emerge while the institution of the *Khilāfah* remained. The Turkish nationalist forces quickly and clearly understood that the nation-State in the Islamic milieu either had to summon the courage to take control of Islām and subordinate Islām to the State or suffer the fate (i.e., from their perspective) of having Islām take control of the State and restore *Dār al-Islām*.

It was no surprise, therefore, when the Turkish Grand National Assembly adopted, on March 3<sup>rd</sup> 1924, another law abolishing the *Khilāfah*. Article 1 of the Law stated:

“The Khalīfah is deposed. The office of the Khilāfah is abolished, since the Khilāfah is essentially comprised in the meaning and signification of the words Government (Hukūmah) and Republic (Jumhuriyyah)”<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Official Turkish Text in Qawanin Majmuasi 1924/1340, No 431, Ankara; press of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. English translation in Survey, Op cit, Appendix 11 (3) p 575.

The passage of this law marked a decisive moment in the history of the *Ummah*. After a period of thirteen hundred years during which the institution of the *Khilāfah* was almost universally recognized by Muslims (i.e., Sunni Muslims) as essential to their religion, even when the seat of the *Khilāfah* was filled in ways which were contrary to the principles of Islām, the world of Islām found itself in the fourteenth century of its existence without a *Khalīfah*. Indeed so definite and permanent was the change that one could, perhaps, be forgiven for concluding that the world of Islām had now passed into the post-*Khilāfah* period of its existence.

## **The Response of Al-Azhar University to the Abolition of the Ottoman *Khilāfah***

The significance of the abolition of the *Khilāfah* was to be found in the very Article One of the Law of Abolition, to wit, the *Khilāfah* was being replaced by the modern secular nation-State. An institution considered to be a part of the religion of Islām was being replaced, under the impact of *Dajjāl's* western political thought and civilization, by a political system which belonged to the western world. In addition, terminology (*Hukūmah* and *Jumhuriyyah*), used in the old orthodox model were

now being used in a new sense to fit the new model. As great a thinker as Dr. Muhammad Iqbāl did not understand the true nature of the change which was taking place and as a consequence, made a mountain of a mistake.<sup>8</sup>

To the extent that the *Khilāfah* formed part of the religion of Islām it was very clear that a massive and (from the religious viewpoint) quite reprehensible *Bid'ah* was being perpetrated, and this required an appropriate religious response. Twenty-two days after the passage of

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<sup>8</sup> "Let us now see how the (Turkish) Grand National Assembly has exercised this power of *Ijtihād* in regard to the institution of *Khilāfah* (Caliphate). According to Sunni Law the appointment of an *Imām* or *Khalīfah* is absolutely indispensable. The first question that arises in this connection is this: Should the Caliphate be vested in a single person? Turkey's *Ijtihād* is that according to the spirit of Islam the Caliphate or Imamate can be vested in a body of persons, or an elected Assembly (e.g., the Turkish Grand National Assembly or Parliament). The religious doctors of Islam in Egypt and India, as far as I know, have not yet expressed themselves on this point. Personally I believe the Turkish view is perfectly sound. It is hardly necessary to argue this point. The republican form of government is not only thoroughly consistent with the spirit of Islam, but has also become a necessity in view of the new forces that are set free in the world of Islam" [Iqbāl, M: The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam; Oxford University Press. London. 1934 Chap. vi "The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam", p. 149]

the law in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the Rector of *Al-Azhar* University in Cairo met with the leading *Ulamā* of the University, and of Egypt, and the following declaration concerning the *Khilāfah* was issued:

“The *Khilāfah*, which is synonymous with the *Imāmah*, is a general leadership (*Ri’āsah*) in matters of *al-Dīn* and of *al-Duniya*. Its fundamental function is to watch over the interests of the *Millat* and over the administration of the *Ummah*”.

The declaration located this ‘general leadership’ in the office of the *Imām* who was defined as:

“...the deputy of the promulgator of the religious law for the defense of the faith, for the application of its precepts and for the administration of mundane affairs as the *Shari’ah* provides.

”The *Imām* becomes the *Imām* in virtue of the payment of allegiance (*Bai’ah*) on the part of those with the power to ‘loose and bind’ (*Ahl al-halli wal-‘aqd*)<sup>9</sup> or else being chosen by his predecessor to succeed him.

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<sup>9</sup> This group was supposed to constitute a virtual electoral college in the classical model of Islam. Throughout Islamic history, however, it

“The Imāmate can also be acquired by conquest in the sense that if another party masters the *Khalīfah* and usurps his place, the *Khalīfah* loses his office. Sometimes acquisition by conquest is reinforced by payment of allegiance or by the choice of the preceding *Khalīfah* as was the case with the majority of the *Khulafāh* of the past.”<sup>10</sup>

Turning to the concrete situation facing them, the declaration condemned as *Bid’ah* without precedent in Islām, first the appointment of ‘Abdul Majīd to a *Khilāfah* stripped of its temporal power, this being assumed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and secondly the abolition of the *Khilāfah*.

Since these *Bid’ah* were totally incompatible with the tenets of the faith, the *Ulamā* concluded that an Islamic Congress should be convened, to which representatives of all Muslim peoples should be invited,

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almost always remained a mere theoretical construction and played no role in the supreme decision-making process.

<sup>10</sup> This declaration is very significant in the context of present-day efforts to re-establish an authentic Islamic Order. It depicts glaring defects in the understanding of the Islamic system of leadership by that supreme center of Islamic learning. Full text: Survey, Op. cit., Appendix 111, pp 576-8.

in order to consider on whose shoulders the Islamic *Khilāfah* ought to be placed.

This then was the first serious response of the world of Islām to the abolition of the Ottoman *Khilāfah*. But it is important to note that the proposal represented a significant departure from traditional political behavior in the orthodox model of Islām. One might even describe it as *Bid'ah*. The al-Azhar *Ulamā* were proposing to use an Islamic Congress, albeit with representatives of all Muslim peoples participating, to appoint a new *Khalīfah*. Not since the first half of the first century of Islamic history had a *Khalīfah* been freely elected by the people. And never in the entire history of Islām had he ever been elected by an Assembly or Congress representative of all the Islamic peoples<sup>11</sup>

The proposal encountered such difficulties that the Committee charged with planning for the Congress substituted the explosive issue of the election of a new *Khalīfah* for the less controversial and more practical subject of an analysis of the situation and possible responses. What is of the greatest importance, however,

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<sup>11</sup> So novel, indeed, was the proposal that it was denounced by the Chief Qadi of Transjordan as an innovation which was contrary to orthodox religious practice. Survey, Op. cit., p 84.

is that for the first time since the very earliest period of the history of Muslim polity, the idea was publicly advanced by a prestigious body of learned Muslims that the most important affairs of the *Ummah* could be discussed and decisions taken by an assembly or congress representative of all Muslim peoples.

It is extremely difficult to determine whether this can be attributed to the influence of western civilization, as Toynbee would have us believe.<sup>12</sup> It nevertheless remains true that, to the extent that the proposed Congress would have utilized *Shūrah* and *Ijmā'a* it would have been closer to orthodox Islām than the *Khilāfah* as all but the first few decades of its existence depicted it.

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<sup>12</sup> "When the Great National Assembly of Angora (Ankara) abolished the Ottoman Caliphate and when the Wahhābis drove the Hāshimi dynasty out of the *Hejāz*, the general impulse in Islām was to deal with the situation by the modern Western method of convening an international conference and not by the traditional Islamic method of preaching a Holy War." Survey, Op. cit., p 24.

## CHAPTER THREE

It was in defiance of this corruption of the religion that the grandson of the Prophet (sallallahu ‘alaihi wa sallam) Imām Husain (radiallahu ‘anhu), courageously raised the standard of dissent against the illegitimate demand for *Bai’ah* from Yazeed, the son of Amīr Muāwiyah (radiallahu ‘anhu). He paid the price for that dissent with martyrdom on the plain of Karbala. But there is an unfinished revolutionary struggle at Karbala which will be dramatically completed with the advent of *Imām al-Mahdi* (‘alaihi al-Salām). *It is a struggle to restore the religion established by the blessed Prophet, which was corrupted by the forces of counter-revolution.*



Islamic eschatology would have led the Congress to the realization that the world was now in the control of Gog and Magog, and that so long as the Gog and Magog world order persisted, it would remain impossible to restore the authentic *Khilāfah*.

## *The Khilāfah Conference in Cairo (May 1926)*

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### **Agenda**

The *Khilāfah* Congress, which finally met in Cairo in May 1926, had on its agenda the examination of the following items:

1. The definition of the *Khilāfah* and of the qualifications required in the *Khalīfah*.
2. Is the *Khilāfah* a necessity in Islām?
3. How is the *Khilāfah* contracted?
4. Is it possible at the present time to constitute a *Khilāfah* that fulfills all the requirements of the *Shari'ah*?
5. Supposing that the answer to the fourth point is in the negative, what action should be taken?
6. Supposing that the Congress decides that it is necessary to appoint a *Khalīfah*, what steps should be taken to give effect to this decision?

## Delegates

The delegates who attended the Congress came from Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, South Africa, Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia), Yemen, *Hejāz* (now in Saūdi Arabia), Palestine, Iraq and Poland. Conspicuously absent were delegates from many important Islamic countries and communities, - Turkey, Persia (now Iran), Afghanistan, *Nejd* (now in Saūdi Arabia) and the Muslim communities of Russia, China and India.

Turkey declined the invitation to attend with the cold reply that the country had no *Khilāfah* problem. Persia, a *Shia* country, evinced no interest in the *Sunni Khilāfah* Congress. The Muslims of Russia, China and India, all minorities living in hostile environments, adopted a common attitude. They stayed away from the Cairo conference of May 1926, regarding it as a mere academic exercise, a gathering devoid of any real power and unlikely to offer them any tangible assistance and protection. But they did so primarily because a rival conference had been arranged by one who appeared to be a real power, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn Saūd. In fact he was, himself, in mortal fear of the re-emergence of the *Khilāfah* since he had just wrested control of the holy cities of Makkah and Madina for his royal house.

Finally, among the delegates present in Cairo, was the head of the *Sānūsī* (Sufi) Order, al-Sayyed Idris al-Sānūsī, designated as *Amīr* of Barka and Tripoli. It was rumored that there was a strong possibility of him being elected as *Khalīfah* if the Congress were to decide to elect one.<sup>13</sup>

## Congress Sessions

The Congress met in Cairo in four sessions on 13th, 15th, 18th and 19th May 1926. At the first session the First Committee was appointed “to examine proposals and bring them before the Congress”. The Committee immediately proposed that the proceedings of the Congress be held “in secret”. This proposal was rejected in the fourth plenary session with the result that we

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<sup>13</sup> Sylvia Haim claims that there was enough evidence to prove that the Congress was planned and encouraged through the instigation of King Fuād who was secretly hoping to gain the Caliphate for himself. But this was not feasible because of opposition in and out of Egypt. Cf. Arnold, Op. cit. pp 241-2. While this may be true, the public position of Fuād was disinterest in the Caliphate. S’ād Zaghlūl, his Prime Minister, remained neutral on the subject.

possess, as a public document, the entire Verbatim Record of this Congress.<sup>14</sup>

The Second and Third Committees were appointed in the second plenary session, the Second Committee to examine Items 1, 2 and 3 of the Congress Agenda and the Third Committee to examine Items 4, 5 and 6. The Reports of the Second and Third Committees and the discussions and decisions based on these reports formed the very core of the work of the Congress. And it is to the analysis of these reports that we now turn.

## **The Second Committee**

In defining the institution of the *Khilāfah*, the Second Committee relied on the authoritative writings of scholars like al-Māwardī, Ibn Khaldūn and others. In particular, they laid emphasis on the fact that the *Khalīfah* must combine, in his office, ‘temporal’ as well as ‘religious’ leadership, since Islām tolerated no separation of religion from politics or ‘church’ from ‘State’. Secondly, there could only be one *Khalīfah* at a

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<sup>14</sup> The Verbatim Record of the conference was translated into French and published by A. Sekaly in *Revue du Monde Musulman*, Vol. 1, p. xiv, Paris, 1926. It is this text which is being used by the writer.

time since, among other things, the role of the institution of the *Khilāfah* was to unify the *Ummah*.<sup>15</sup>

The second question before the Committee (*Is the Khilāfah a necessity in Islām?*) was, to say the least, quite incredible. Here was an institution which had always been of pivotal importance to *Sunni* Muslim polity and which had been with Muslims from the time of the death of the Prophet. In its entire history, the *Ummah* had not only lived with the *Khilāfah* but, in addition, had never considered even the possibility of an alternative.

Indeed, in the act of suggesting that an alternative to the *Khalīfah* was possible, one would have been exposing one's self to the very grave charge of indulging in *Bid'ah*. And yet, in consequence of the fiat of one man, Mustafa Kamal of Turkey, here was the highest seat of learning in the entire world of Islām presenting

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<sup>15</sup> In addition to pointing out that the Caliph was needed to "execute judgments, apply legal sanctions, close the ports, raise the armies etc.", the Committee considered it sufficiently important to quote Ahadīth (sayings of the Prophet) to the effect that:

*"Whoever dies without having known the Caliph of his time dies a pagan death"; and "Whoever dies without having taken the baiy'ah (oath of allegiance to the Caliph or Amir) dies a pagan death."*

Revue, Op. cit., pp 74-6

for the consideration of the *Khilāfah* Congress the question - *Is the Khilāfah a necessity in Islām?*

And yet, perhaps, this was the most important question the *Ummah* ever had to answer in its entire history. For it turned out, inevitably, that the Committee confirmed that the *Khilāfah* was a necessity in Islām but that it could not, at that point in time, be realized.<sup>16</sup> In other words, Allah had placed on the Muslims an obligation that they could not, at that time, fulfill. But this was hardly a satisfactory answer to the question since Allah, by virtue of being Omniscient, could not place on His servants an obligation they could not fulfill.

Either, then, the *Khilāfah* was not a necessity in Islām, or it was a necessity and could not be realized. In which case failure to re-establish the *Khilāfah* would be a collective sin for which the believers would be punished.

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid, pp 75-6. In doing so, the Committee disregarded the views of the Mu'tazilites who regarded the Caliphate as a matter of expediency, and the Khawārij who adopted the position that there was no need for the Caliphate. The Committee also chose to disregard the view expressed by *Shaikh* 'Ali 'Abd al-Rāziq, a graduate of *Al-Azhar*, who argued, in a paper which was published in Egypt, that the Caliphate was not a necessity in Islam. His views created quite a stir in Egypt.

The Committee never considered the possibility that Muslims were located in 1926 in *Ākhir al-Zamān*, and that Gog and Magog had robbed the *Ummah* of Nabi Muhammad (sallallahu ‘alaihi wa sallam) of the *Khilāfah* State and that *Dajjāl* had then check-mated them to ensure that *Khilāfah* could not be recovered.

In respect of the third question (*How is the Khilāfah achieved or constituted?*) the Committee answered as follows:

1. By appointment by the preceding *Khalīfah*.
2. By appointment by the classes of influential Muslims, i.e., men whom the public must obey, such as *Ulamā*, Amirs, notables, men of opinion and administration.
3. By conquest by a Muslim even if he does not *fulfill the other conditions*.<sup>17</sup>

The presentation of this Report by the Second Committee led to a very important and interesting debate between ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Effendi, a Tunisian Professor who was one of the Iraqi delegates, and *Shaikh* Muhammad al-Ahmadi al-Zawāhiri, head of the

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<sup>17</sup> Revue, Op. cit., pp 76-7

Egyptian delegation,<sup>18</sup> on the applicability of Islamic theoretical principles and the necessity of *Ijtihād*:

Thalibi Effendi:

“No one can dispute the fact that the question of the *Khilāfah* is the most important and the most difficult to resolve. I therefore propose an adjournment of the Congress until next year so that we may be able to study the problem in detail and in all its aspects. It will not suffice to examine the problem from the purely theoretic point of view. Some account must be taken of the necessity of circumstances and places, (and) of the influence exerted upon Islamic institutions by the policies of certain foreign powers.”

Shaikh al-Zawāhiri:

“In the examination of theological questions which were submitted to us, we did not wish to resort to *Ijtihād* and to establish a new doctrine. We confined ourselves to examining the principles admitted by the recognized doctrines of Islām. As for the applicability of these principles, it is for you to declare that that is beyond our competence.”

Thalibi Effendi:

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<sup>18</sup> He became the Rector of *Al-Azhar* in 1929

“I am advocating neither a new doctrine nor *Ijtihād*. What I seek is your opinion. If you affirm principles which are not susceptible of application in our epoch, what will be the circumstances?”

Shaikh al-Zawāhiri:

“It is dangerous for Islām to raise the question of the applicability, at one epoch rather than another, of the dispositions of the *Shari’ah*. We feel that the application of the general principles of religion ought to be subject to no exceptions, and we consider that there is no condition to establish new conditions in deference to the exigencies of the age.”<sup>19</sup>

Shaikh al-Zawāhiri was, of course, perfectly justified in insisting that the *Shari’ah*, or divinely revealed sacred law of Islām, admitted of no revisions to suit differing situations and ages. The *Shari’ah* had to be retained in its revealed form regardless of whether or not the Muslims found themselves competent or not to apply it in a particular age. And so for *Shaikh* Zawahiri the restoration of the *Khilāfah* was a religious obligation. He was quite correct!

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<sup>19</sup> Revue, Op. cit., pp 77-8

And Thalibi Effendi was more than justified in posing the question, for which he received no answer, to wit, if the restoration of the *Khilāfah* is a religious duty incumbent upon Muslims, what will be the consequences for Muslims if they failed in the effort to restore the *Khilāfah*?

The basic deficiency in the approach of both Zawahiri and Thalibi Effendi was their failure to heed the clear statement of the Qur'ān to the effect that Allah sent to each religious community both a *Shari'ah* and a *Minhāj* (or an open way).<sup>20</sup> As a consequence, in addition to the eternal unchanging sacred law to which Zawahiri rightly insists we must always be faithful, there was also the flexible *Minhāj* wherein human genius could express itself in adapting to changing situations and conditions while yet preserving the sacred Law.

The basic problem that the Second Committee and the Congress failed to recognize and to address and, as a result, which led to the failure of the Congress, was the problem of re-examining the traditional so-called orthodox interpretation of the Islamic public order (*Dār al-Islām*) and the Islamic conception of the International Order. The institution of the *Khilāfah* did not exist in a

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<sup>20</sup> (*Qur'ān, al-Māidah, 5:48*)

vacuum. It formed part of *Dār al-Islām*. *Dār al-Islām* no longer existed in the world in 1924. It did not exist even in Makkah and Madina. The world of Islām had returned to its *pre-Hijri* stage of existence.

## Islamic Eschatology and the abolition of the Khilāfah State

Since the Qurʾān had declared that “it explains all things” (*Qurʾān, al-Nahl, 16:89*), Islamic scholarship should have directed attention to the Qurʾān to locate in it that which could have explained the demise of the Islamic *Khilāfah* and of *Dār al-Islām*. The Conference would then have benefitted from such an explanation.

By 1926 more than 30 years had already passed since a very important Sign of *Ākhir al-Zamān*, located in the Qurʾān, had already appeared in the world. This was the discovery of Pharaoh’s body that was prophesied in the Qurʾān in *Sūrah Yūnus*:

فَالْيَوْمَ نُنَجِّيكَ بِيَدِنَا لَتَكُونَ لِمَنْ خَلَفَكَ آيَةً وَإِنَّ  
كَثِيرًا مِّنَ النَّاسِ عَن آيَاتِنَا لَغَافِلُونَ

[Nay,] but today We shall save your (physical) body, so that you (i.e., your physical body) (when it is discovered) may (function as) a Sign for (a people) who will come after you: for, behold, a good many people are heedless of Our Signs!"

(Qur'ān, Yunus, 10:92)

This same prophecy is repeated elsewhere in the Qur'ān:

وَنَادَى فِرْعَوْنُ فِي قَوْمِهِ قَالَ يَا قَوْمِ أَلَيْسَ لِي مُلْكُ مِصْرَ  
وَهَذِهِ الْأَنْهَارُ تَجْرِي مِن تَحْتِي أَفَلَا تُبْصِرُونَ

And Pharaoh issued a call to his people, saying: "O my people! Does not the dominion over Egypt belong to me, since all these running waters flow at my feet? Can you not, then, see [that I am your lord supreme]?"

أَمْ أَنَا خَيْرٌ مِّنْ هَذَا الَّذِي هُوَ مَهِينٌ وَلَا يَكَادُ يُبِينُ

Am I not better than this contemptible man who can hardly make his meaning clear?

فَلَوْلَا أُلْتِمَىٰ عَلَيْهِ أَسْوَرَةٌ مِّنْ ذَهَبٍ أَوْ جَاءَ مَعَهُ الْمَلَأِكَةُ  
مُقْتَرِنِينَ

“And then - why have no golden armlets been bestowed on him? or why have no angels come together with him?”

فَاسْتَحَفَّ قَوْمَهُ فَأَطَاعُوهُ إِنَّهُمْ كَانُوا قَوْمًا فَاسِقِينَ

Thus he incited his people to levity, and they obeyed him: for, behold, they were people depraved!

فَلَمَّا آسَفُونَا انتَقَمْنَا مِنْهُمْ فَأَغْرَقْنَاهُمْ أَجْمَعِينَ

But when they continued to challenge Us, We inflicted Our retribution on them, and drowned them all:

فَجَعَلْنَاهُمْ سَلَفًا وَمَثَلًا لِلْآخِرِينَ

and so We made them a thing of the past, and an example to those who would come after them.

(Qur'ān, Al-Zukhruf, 43:51-6)

It is almost universally agreed upon that the body of a Pharaoh which was discovered by Loret in Thebes in 1898 was that of the Pharaoh who was drowned in consequence of that divine intervention. The only ones who dispute this fact appear to be the Zionists.

Prior to sitting down in a *Khilāfah* Conference in 1926 to ponder over their response to the abolition of

the Ottoman *Khilāfah* and the destruction by ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Ibn Saūd of Sharīf Husain’s short-lived Arab *Khilāfah*, Islamic scholarship had as long a period of time as 30-odd years, subsequent to the discovery of Pharaoh’s body, to answer urgent and important questions.

If proper methodology for the study of the Qur’ān had been applied to the study of this momentous Divinely-ordained Sign of *Ākhir al-Zamān* (i.e., the recovery of Pharaoh’s body), it would have led Islamic scholarship to the study of Islamic eschatology, wherein was to be found the explanation of the *reality* that confronted the Congress in 1926.

What was the meaning of that momentous Sign for which Allah Most High miraculously preserved Pharaoh’s physical body for some 3000 years? Who could they be who would come at a later time and for whom the recovery of Pharaoh’s physical body would constitute a Sign which would be the mother of all warnings?

We can safely dismiss as manifestly inadequate the view that this was a mere divine prophecy which, when it came to pass, was meant to impress upon all of mankind the divine origin of the Qur’ān. The Qur’ān

addressed that subject elsewhere and in a manner that was both adequate and conclusive. The miracle was therefore meant to convey a message other than that, or beyond that!

Our view is that the miracle conveyed a message that there would be a people who would come after Pharaoh, i.e., in *Ākhir al-Zamān*, who, because they would *live the way Pharaoh lived* would consequently *die the way Pharaoh died*. Pharaoh died in consequence of a divine intervention, and at the moment of death he abandoned his false beliefs and embraced the Truth of Islam (i.e., belief in the one True God of Abraham ‘alaihi al-Salām). Despite this acceptance of Truth at his moment of death it was of no benefit for him since he nevertheless, was destined for the hell-fire:

وَلَقَدْ أَرْسَلْنَا مُوسَىٰ بِآيَاتِنَا وَسُلْطَانٍ مُّبِينٍ

And, indeed, We sent Moses with Our messages and a manifest authority [from Us]

إِلَىٰ فِرْعَوْنَ وَمَلَئِهِ فَاتَّبَعُوا أَمْرَ فِرْعَوْنَ وَمَا أَمْرُ فِرْعَوْنَ  
بِرَشِيدٍ

unto Pharaoh and his great ones: but these followed [only]  
Pharaoh's bidding - and Pharaoh's bidding led by no means to what  
is right.

يَقْدُمُ قَوْمَهُ يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ فَأَوْرَدَهُمُ النَّارَ وَبِئْسَ الْوَرْدُ  
الْمَوْرَدُ

[And so] he shall go before his people on the Day of Resurrection,  
having led them [in this world] towards the fire [of the life to come];  
and vile was the destination towards which they were led –  
(Qur'ān, Hud, 11:96-98)

The warning of the Qur'ān to a people who would  
come after Pharaoh is that since they lived the way he  
lived, they will also die in consequence of a divine  
intervention and will die the way he died – i.e., that they  
would embrace the Truth of Islam at the moment of  
death, but such an embrace of Truth will not benefit  
them and they also will be punished with hell-fire. This  
prophecy would come to pass when Pharaoh's body was  
discovered. Who could those people be?

In fact the question of the identity of the people  
was but a part of that last grand chapter of history with  
which history would conclude, and the recovery of

Pharaoh's body heralded the count-down of an age which would witness a re-enactment of the epic encounter between Pharaoh and Moses ('alaihi al-Salām).

It was already a very well-known fact that Islamic eschatology recognized the miraculous return of Jesus, the true Messiah, to be the event of divine intervention which would witness the final and conclusive triumph of truth and justice over falsehood, oppression, and all rivals to Truth. The divine intervention which heralds the return of Jesus ('alaihi al-Salām) should also, therefore, witness the destruction of a people in a similar way to the destruction of Pharaoh and his armed forces, and at their moment of death those people should also accept the truth the way Pharaoh did before he died. Who could those people be?

Fortunately for us the Qur'ān answers that question:

وَقَوْلِهِمْ إِنَّا قَتَلْنَا الْمَسِيحَ عِيسَى ابْنَ مَرْيَمَ رَسُولَ اللَّهِ  
وَمَا قَتَلُوهُ وَمَا صَلَبُوهُ وَلَكِنْ شُبِّهَ لَهُمْ وَإِنَّ الَّذِينَ

اِخْتَلَفُوا فِيهِ لَفِيَ شَكٌّ مِّنْهُ مَا لَهُمْ بِهِ مِنْ عِلْمٍ إِلَّا اتِّبَاعَ  
الظَّنِّ وَمَا قَتَلُوهُ يَقِينًا

and their boast, "Behold, we have slain the Messiah Jesus, son of Mary, [who claimed to be] an apostle of Allah!" However, they did not slay him, and neither did they crucify him, but it only seemed to them [as if it had been] so; and, verily, those who hold conflicting views thereon are indeed confused, having no [real] knowledge thereof, and following mere conjecture. For, of a certainty, they did not slay him:

بَل رَفَعَهُ اللَّهُ إِلَيْهِ وَكَانَ اللَّهُ عَزِيزًا حَكِيمًا

nay, Allah raised him unto Himself - and Allah is indeed almighty, wise.

وَإِنْ مِنْ أَهْلِ الْكِتَابِ إِلَّا لَيُؤْمِنَنَّ بِهِ قَبْلَ مَوْتِهِ وَيَوْمَ  
الْقِيَامَةِ يَكُونُ عَلَيْهِمْ شَهِيدًا

And (be warned that) there is not one of the followers of earlier revelation who would not, at the moment of his death, but have to declare his faith in the truth about Jesus (i.e., at that time of his miraculous return); and on the Day of Resurrection he [Jesus] shall bear witness to the truth against them. (Hence they will die the way Pharaoh died.)

فَبِظُلْمٍ مِّنَ الَّذِينَ هَادُوا حَرَّمْنَا عَلَيْهِمْ طَيِّبَاتٍ أُحِلَّتْ  
لَهُمْ وَبَصَدَّاهُمْ عَن سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ كَثِيرًا

So, then, for the wickedness committed by those who followed the Jewish faith did We deny unto them certain of the good things of life which [aforetime] had been allowed to them; and [We did this] for their having so often turned away from the path of God,

وَأَخَذِهِمُ الرِّبَا وَقَدْ نُهُوا عَنْهُ وَأَكْلِهِمْ أَمْوَالَ النَّاسِ  
بِالْبَاطِلِ وَأَعْتَدْنَا لِلْكَافِرِينَ مِنْهُمْ عَذَابًا أَلِيمًا

and [for] their taking usury, although it had been forbidden to them, and their wrongful devouring of other people's possessions. And for those from among them who [continue to] deny the truth We have readied grievous suffering.

(Qur'ān, al-Nisā, 4:157-161)

The above passage from the Qur'ān first identified the people as *Ahl al-Kitāb*, but then went on to make specific reference to them as Jews. Hence the discovery of Pharaoh's body in 1898 should have alerted the world of Islamic scholarship that events would now unfold in the world which would re-enact the epic encounter between Pharaoh and Moses ('alāhi al-Salām) in such wise

as would culminate with the return of Jesus (‘alaihi al-Salām). The Jews would then suffer the same fate that befell Pharaoh. Those events constituted the very heart of Islamic eschatology.

Events had already begun to unfold one year before the discovery of Pharaoh’s body which should have alerted the world of Islamic scholarship. The first Zionist Congress took place in Basel, Switzerland from August 29 to 31, 1897, and was convened and chaired by Theodor Herzl, the founder of the modern Zionist movement. The second and third Congresses took place in the same Swiss city of Basel in 1898 and 1899. The reason why Basel was chosen was because there was considerable Jewish opposition to Zionism in established Jewish communities elsewhere in Europe. But in 1900 the Zionists made a break-through when their fourth Congress was held in London of all cities, and they were thus able to exploit a nascent positive shift in public opinion amongst British Jews. The Congress returned to Basel in 1901 (5<sup>th</sup>) and again in 1903 (6<sup>th</sup>), by which time Herzl had met with Sultān ‘Abdul Hamīd in Constantinople in a futile attempt to get him to cooperate with the Zionist plan for the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. Subsequent Congresses took

place in Basel in 1905 (7<sup>th</sup>), The Hague 1907 (8<sup>th</sup>) and Hamburg 1909 (9<sup>th</sup>). There was considerable delight at the Hamburg Congress since the success of the secular 'Young Turk' revolution against the Ottoman Sultan in the Ottoman State advanced the realization of the Zionist dream. Two more Congresses were held in Basel 1911(10<sup>th</sup>) and Vienna 1913 (11<sup>th</sup>) before the outbreak of the first World-War in 1914.

Soon after the outbreak of the war Sharīf Husain, who had become a client of the Zionist Judeo-Christian Britain in return for a princely annual bribe of 7 million pounds, rebelled against the Ottoman State and took control of Makkah in his own name.

Shortly thereafter the British government announced in 1917 the Balfour Declaration in which Britain declared publicly its policy of working for the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. And in that same year a British army led by General Allenby defeated the Ottoman army and took control of Jerusalem. The League of Nations then conferred on Britain a mandate to rule over Palestine.

The defeat of the Ottoman State in the first World-War and the subsequent abolition of the Caliphate by

the secular 'Young Turks' should have come as no great surprise to Islamic scholarship since the signs were consistently pointing in a direction that only Islamic eschatology could explain. The explanation was that it would not be possible to restore the Caliphate until this chapter of *end-time* history was completed and the Jews had suffered the same fate as Pharaoh.

(Readers should kindly refer to my books entitled '*Jerusalem in the Qur'ān*', '*Sūrah al-Kahf and the Modern Age*' and '*An Islamic View of Gog and Magog in the Modern World*' for a further explanation of this subject. A fourth book entitled '*An Islamic View of Dajjāl the false Messiah or Anti-Christ*' is still being written.)

Islamic eschatology would have led the Congress to the realization that the world was now in the control of Gog and Magog, and that so long as the Gog and Magog world-order persisted, it would remain impossible to restore the authentic *Khilāfah*.

*Sūrah al-Kahf* of the Qur'ān would have provided the Congress with *Minhāj* or the strategy of the establishment of micro-*Khilāfah* through which Muslims would create a multiplicity of *Jama'āt* in all parts of the world of Islām, each with its own *Amīr/Imām*, with each *Imām* receiving the *Bai'ah* from the members of the

*Jamā'ah* and carefully conducting the affairs of the *Jamā'ah*, to the maximum extent possible, in a manner which conformed with the *Shari'ah*. Whenever the possibility arose for the *Saūdi-Wahhābi* rule over the *Hejāz* to be ended, and for Muslims to restore true independence to the *Hejāz*, it would then be possible for that *Dār al-Islām* which had been established by the blessed Prophet himself, to be restored. An *Amīr* would be appointed over that *Dār al-Islām*, and every other *Amīr* over every *Jamā'ah* in the world would have to give the *Bai'ah* to the *Amīr* of *Dār al-Islām*!

It was the command of the Prophet (sallallahu 'alahi wa sallam) that if there were two persons claiming to be *Amīr* over the *Jamā'ah* of Muslims, at one and the same time (i.e., in *Dār al-Islām*), then the second of the two should be killed.

It is of crucial importance to note that the verse of the Qur'ān:

“Oh you who believe, obey Allah, and obey the Messenger (of Allah), and obey those in (lawfully constituted) authority from amongst you.”

(Qur'ān, al-Nisā, 4:59)

did not command obedience of *he* (i.e., a single person) who was in authority. It rather required obedience of *those* in authority. The Qur'ān thus explicitly recognized the possibility of a (temporary) plurality of micro-leadership in the *Ummah* so long as there was no *Dār al-Islām* and hence no possibility of appointing a single *Amīr* over *Dār al-Islām*.

The Second Committee failed to examine this possibility and, as a consequence, the Congress itself ended in failure. The report of the Second Committee contained another significant defect, a defect which belonged to the classical Islamic political theory. According to the report, the office of the *Khalīfah* could be filled through the *nomination* of the previous *Khalīfah*, or it could be *seized through conquest*.

Neither in the Qur'ān, nor in the *Sunnah* of the Prophet, nor in the example of the *Khulafā al-Rāshidūn* was there any foundation whatsoever for the belief that leadership in Islām could be acquired through conquest or through the nomination of the previous *Khalīfah*. And yet it is instructive to note that through most of Islamic history and even in the contemporary Muslim world we find leadership constituted almost invariably as dynastic

kingships or through conquests (modern-day military rule or 'martial law' now forms part of *conquests*).

Succeeding generations of Islamic scholars misunderstood the true nature of the alleged nomination of the second *Khalīfah*, Umar, by the first *Khalīfah*, Abū Bakr (radiullahu 'anhuma). Indeed one suspects that many *Sunni Ulamā* exploited the misconception in their centuries of *post-facto* theorization to provide doctrinal legitimacy to the centuries of dynastic monarchy in Islām. In fact the first *Khalīfah*, Abū Bakr *al-Siddīq* (radiuallah 'anhu) nominated his successor, Umar *al-Fārūq* (radiuallah 'anhu), not because the office of the *Khilāfah* gave him the right to do so, but because the people, who possessed the right to appoint the new *Khalīfah*, freely delegated that right to him.

In fact the *Ulamā* were colossally mistaken in declaring that the *Shari'ah* permitted the incumbent *Khalīfah* to appoint his successor and, as a consequence, in supporting all through the history of the *Khilāfah*, and even to this day, such dynastic monarchies as the Umayyads, the Abbasids, the Ottoman *Khilāfah*, the Saūdi monarchy in Saūdi Arabia, the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan, the Sharīfian monarchy in Morocco and the numerous Gulf monarchies.

And then, to confound matters even more, the *Ulamā* conferred on Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, Uthmān, and ‘Ali (may Allah be pleased with them all) the title of *Khulafā al-Rāshidūn* (the rightly guided *Khulafāh*), thus confirming that there was something significantly wrong with Muāwiya’s *Khilāfah*, and with all those who followed him. And, of course, what was particularly striking about the *Khilāfah* of the first four *Khulafāh* was the total absence of even the faintest suspicion of dynastic monarchy or the acquisition of the Office through conquest. [We are aware that there are some who question the wisdom of the *Ulamā* in bringing down the curtain of rightly guided *Khilāfah* upon the death of Ali. They would insist that Muāwiyah be also included. They form, however, an insignificant and hopefully vanishing minority within the ranks of *Sunni* Islamic scholarship].

The predicament of the *Ulamā* at the *Khilāfah* Congress of 1926 was, and should still be, cause for serious concern. In 1924 they protested the abolition of the Ottoman *Khilāfah* that was, in fact, a dynastic monarchy that took the *Khilāfah* out of the Arab world and thus prepared the way for its demise. And in 1926 they were utterly incapable, even at the level of conceptual analysis, of responding coherently to the

destruction of that so-called Ottoman *Khilāfah* in a manner that conformed with the requirements of the religion.

The fundamental verse of the Qur'ān concerning the dynamics of leadership in the model of Islām stated that Muslims must conduct their affairs on the basis of mutual consultation:

وَالَّذِينَ اسْتَجَابُوا لِرَبِّهِمْ وَأَقَامُوا الصَّلَاةَ وَأَمْرُهُمْ شُورَى  
بَيْنَهُمْ وَمِمَّا رَزَقْنَاهُمْ يُنْفِقُونَ

“. . . and who respond to [the call of] their Lord-God and are constant in prayer; and whose rule [in all matters of common concern] is consultation among themselves; and who spend on others out of what We provide for them as sustenance.

(Qur'ān, al-Shūrah, 42:38)

The basic implication of this verse was that in an Islamic community the appointment of the leader and his removal and replacement by another (which is the most important of all the collective affairs of the believers), must be effected through a process of mutual consultation amongst all the believers. In recognizing the right of the incumbent *Khalīfah* to appoint his

successor or of the office of the *Khilāfah* being acquired by conquest, the *Ulamā*<sup>21</sup> were in manifest conflict with the Qur'ān since the believers were being denied a right given to them by Allah Himself.

Indeed the believers, for almost the entire history of the *Ummah*, were inflicted with an even greater injury. They were called upon to ratify (as a religious duty through the *Bai'ah*) at the peril of their lives, appointments to leadership they had no part whatsoever in making. For it was quite clear that refusal to ratify an appointment was considered to be an act of defiance and constituted a visible threat to the *de facto* *Khalīfah* who was merely seeking to legitimize his rule.<sup>22</sup> It was in defiance of this corruption of the religion that the grandson of the Prophet (sallallahu 'alaihi wa sallam) Imām Husain (radiallahu 'anhu), courageously raised the standard of dissent against the illegitimate demand for *Bai'ah*

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<sup>21</sup> Reference is being made to such authorities as al-Māwardī (*al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyyah*), al-Ghazzālī (*Ihya ulūm al-Dīn*). For a detailed exposition of the views of the '*Ulamā*' see Arnold, T. Op. cit.

<sup>22</sup> The fifth Caliph, Muāwiyah, appointed his son, Yazīd, as his successor and was succeeded by him. The grandson of the Prophet, Husain, challenged the legitimacy of Yazīd's Caliphate and paid for it with his life. Not many Muslims cared to follow Husain's example in the centuries which followed.

from Yazeed, the son of Amīr Muāwiyah (radiallahu ‘anhu). He paid the price for that dissent with martyrdom on the plain of Karbala. But there is an unfinished revolutionary struggle at Karbala which will be dramatically completed with the advent of *Imām al-Mahdi* (‘alaihi al-Salām). *It is a struggle to restore the religion established by the blessed Prophet, which was corrupted by the forces of counter-revolution.*

The answer of the Second Committee to the question - How is the *Khilāfah* constituted? - was deficient in another respect. The first and third methods (nomination and conquest), as we have demonstrated, were in conflict with the Qur’ān and found no support from the example of the Prophet and the *Khulafā al-Rāshidūn*. But even in respect of the second method mentioned, to wit - “the choice of the people”, the Second Committee failed to demonstrate the machinery that could have been used in 1926 in order for this method to be applied.

Finally we may again note that the deliberations of the Second Committee clearly revealed that the Azhar *Ulamā*, who did not seem to have made a study of modern thought, were actually unaware of the real nature of the modern State system which was about to

be imposed on the world of Islām and to politically captivate and imprison Muslims while robbing them of political rights and freedom.

## **The Third Committee**

The Third Committee was far more forthright and realistic in its deliberations and courageously concluded in its report to the effect that:

“...the *Khilāfah* ... is incapable of being realized at the present time in view of the situation in which Muslims find themselves.”<sup>23</sup>

The reasons for this were:

“...in the first place there does not yet exist a body of authorized persons legally entitled to make the payment of allegiance (*bai’ah*)”.<sup>24</sup>

The Third Committee was here confessing that the classical machinery (*Ahl al-Halli wal-’Aqd*), supposed to

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<sup>23</sup> Revue, Op. cit. p 103

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. p 108. The text of the report of the Third Committee is to be found in Survey, Op. cit. Appendix 4, pp 578-81

be used in determining the choice of the people, was inoperable in 1926. It would have been more honest if it had also recalled that this machinery had never, in fact, properly operated in Islamic history. It was, however, honest enough to confess that:

“...the *Khilāfah*, in accordance with Islamic Law in the true sense of the term, existed only in early Islām.”<sup>25</sup>

The Committee noted that the Congress had attempted to gather in Cairo the representatives of all the Islamic peoples and to consider the possibility of entrusting to them the task of electing a new *Khalīfah*. The Committee pointed out, however, that the Congress was not representative of all the world of Islām since many important sections of the world Muslim community did not send representatives. Implicit in this statement, we should note, was the implication that if the Congress could have attracted representatives from all the Islamic peoples, it could have elected a *Khalīfah*. This, despite the fact that such an election would have been the very first of its kind in the entire history of Islām.

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid. p 106

But perhaps the most interesting of all the reasons advanced by the Third Committee to explain the impossibility of realizing the *Khilāfah* at that particular time was the fact that:

“ ...a *Khalifah*, if appointed, would not be able to fulfill his basic obligation of exercising effective control over *Dār al-Islām*. Many parts of *Dār al-Islām* were under foreign control. And those few which were free and independent have been possessed by a nationalist agitation which prevents one group from accepting the leadership of another, not to speak of permitting it to interfere in its public affairs.<sup>26</sup>

The Committee did not seem to be even vaguely conscious of the fact that the political concept of *Dār al-Islām* was itself under mortal attack from western secular political thought and was on the verge of passing into oblivion.

What was even more interesting was the fact that parts of the Muslim World that were under foreign occupation should be termed *Dār al-Islām*. By virtue of being under foreign control they no longer formed part of *Dār al-Islām* (because the very definition of *Dār al-Islām* required that it be territory wherein the supreme

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<sup>26</sup> Revue, Op cit, p 106

authority of Allah prevailed over the believers). Secondly, if a single *Khalīfah* could not exercise effective control over the rest of the free Muslim World, this certainly was not something new in Islām. And it did not prevent the *Khilāfah* from so functioning for more than thirteen hundred years.

In fact, the Third Committee should have pointed out that the cities of Makkah and Madina were under *Saūdi-Wahhābi* control and, as a consequence, any *Khalīfah* who was appointed would suffer from the incalculable liability of not having the capacity to exercise control over the *Haramain* and *Hajj*. At a time when there was no *Khalīfah* and the institution itself was under attack, even more so than in normal times, it was imperative for anyone appointed to the office to control the *Haramain* and, thus, the *Hajj*. And this, in fact, had been the basis of Sharīf al-Husain's effort to claim the *Khilāfah* for himself.

The *Saūdi-Wahhābi* ruler who exercised control over the *Haramain* and *Hajj* had given ample demonstration of the fact that he was a power to be reckoned with and, in addition, he was not in the least bit interested in Islām's *Khilāfah*. Herein lay the most fundamental predicament of the *Khilāfah* Congress.

What the Committee should have done, and did not do, was to come to the fairly simple conclusion that no *Khalīfah* could be appointed and win the recognition of the Muslims so long as the all-powerful Zionist Judeo-Christian West provided political and military support for the *Saūdi-Wahhābi* regime which controlled the *Haramain* and *Hajj*.

As a consequence, the imperative of the hour was that of finding ways and means of counteracting British diplomacy in the Arabian Peninsula and ousting Saūdi-British control over the *Haramain* and *Hejāz*. Only thus could Muslims regain control of the *Hajj*. Control over the *Haramain* and *Hajj*, in turn, would facilitate the restoration of the *Khilāfah*. One of the first things that *Imām al-Mahdi* will accomplish would be the liberation of the *Haramain* and the *Hajj* from Zionist *Saūdi-Wahhābi* control.

The Third Committee's report implored the Congress not to be disheartened by the lack of success in solving the problem of the *Khilāfah* and in appointing a new *Khalīfah*:

“It is sufficient for the Congress to know that it has rendered an immense service to Muslims in diagnosing for them the disease and indicating to them the remedy.<sup>27</sup>”

This remedy was the recommendation that:

“...the Islamic peoples should organize in concert in several Islamic countries, successive Congresses which will give them the opportunity of periodic exchanges of views until they succeed in solving the question of the *Khilāfah* in conformity with Islamic interests.<sup>28</sup>”

## **Congress Resolutions**

The Congress was dismayed by the pessimism of the Third Committee’s report. Indeed *Shaikh* al-Zawāhiri dubbed it *the funeral oration of Islām*. The delegates, who had earlier opened the Congress to the public and the press, now decided that one passage of the report should be withheld from the press.<sup>29</sup> *Shaikh* Zawahiri, who had led the opposition to the Third Committee’s

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<sup>27</sup> Revue, Op. cit., p 106

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. p 107

<sup>29</sup> The paragraph is to be found in Revue, Op. cit., p 108, “De ce qui procede ...” , and in the Survey, Op. cit., p 580, “It follows from the above ...”

report, submitted a draft resolution which was adopted by the Congress.<sup>30</sup> The resolution affirmed that the *Khilāfah* was capable of being realized. Another Congress should be convened in which all the Islamic peoples would be adequately represented and that Congress would take the measures necessary for establishing the *Khilāfah*, fulfilling all the conditions prescribed in the *Shari'ah*. In short, such a Congress would elect a new *Khalīfah*.

On this optimistic note the Congress ended. The Third Committee, over-ruled by the Congress, found their misgivings eventually vindicated since the proposed Congress, which was supposed to elect a new *Khalīfah*, was never held. The world of Islām was, in fact, entering into the post-*Khilāfah* period of its existence. And the basic cause for this was *Saūdi-Wahhābi* rule over the *Hejāz* and the *Haramain*, and the eventual establishment of the *Saūdi-Wahhābi* nation-State of Saūdi Arabia as a client State of the Zionist Judeo-Christian Western alliance.

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<sup>30</sup> Text of the Resolution in *Revue*, Op. cit., p 118; *Survey*, Op. cit, pp 89-90

By the time the dust had settled over the *Al-Azhar* initiative in responding to the abolition of the Ottoman *Khilāfah*, it was clear that hostile British and Zionist-Jewish strategy had resulted in a remarkable achievement, to wit: the possibility that the Muslim world had entered into a permanent post-*Khilāfah* stage of its existence!



## CHAPTER FOUR

*“It mattered nothing to them that the system of nation-States, which was the political creation of the new secular West, and which constituted the very foundation of the new secular model of society, was in manifest conflict with the Islamic Public Order provisions of the Shari’ah. What was important to them was the fact that the system of Islamic nation-States would place the Saūdi-Wahhābi rule over the Hejāz in a virtually impregnable position. The Wahhābi State that had raised the greatest objections to Bid’ah (i.e., innovation in religion) was now, itself, proposing the greatest of all Bid’ah in the history of the Ummah!”*

## *The fraudulent Saūdi-Wahhābi alternative to Islam's Khilāfah state*

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### **The World Muslim Congress Makkah: June-July 1926**

The World Muslim Congress, which was held in Makkah in July 1926, had its genesis in the impact of the abolition of the Ottoman *Khilāfah* on the Arabian Peninsula (*Jazīratul 'Arab*) and, in particular, on the House of Saūd which had newly established its rule over Arabia.

'Abdul 'Azīz ibn Saūd had recaptured *Najd* (i.e., a province in eastern Arabia from whence would come, according to a famous prophesy of Prophet Muhammad, "the horns of Satan") after his story-book initial capture of Riyādh in 1902. But in building the political *raison d'être* for the rule of the House of Saūd on the religious foundation of the *Wahhābi* movement, it was inevitable that a *Wahhābi Najd* should challenge the *Hejāz*, whenever the opportunity arose, in order to force the submission of the heart-land of Islām to the *Wahhābi* perception of the true faith.

But there was something far more sinister in the Saudi-Wahhabi designs over the Hejaz. Their 1916 alliance with Britain which was formally established in an Anglo-Saudi Treaty brought it out in the open. Like so many who would come after them, the Saudi-Wahhabis realized that the road to political and military success in Arabia passed through Zionist-London (and subsequently Washington). And they had no hesitation in violating Allah's command in the Qur'ān in order to put that Anglo-Zionist butter on their bread. They were ready and willing to play the role prescribed for them by their Anglo-Zionist allies to take control of Hejaz whenever the opportunity arose to do so, and to then ensure that no one could ever dislodge them. In the process, the Islamic *Khilāfah* would perish. But the British had to pay a price to the Saudi-Wahhabis to win their alliance. The price was a monthly grant of 5000 pounds from Britain.

The opportunity for the Saudi-Wahhabis arose when Husain bin 'Ali (who was appointed by the Ottoman *Khalīfah* as *Sharīf* of Makkah in 1908), acting in concert with the strategy of the Allied Powers in the first World-War, seized the *Hejāz* from the Ottoman Turks in 1916 and imposed over it the rule of the *Hashimite*

House of Husain. In doing so he prohibited the *Wahhābis* from performing the *Hajj*. Apart from the theological conflicts with the *Wahhābis* that he used to justify the ban, he was also conscious of the fact that *Wahhābi Najd* was his most dangerous rival and constituted the most potent threat to his rule over the *Hejāz*.

Husain was in secret contact during the war (i.e., the first World-War) with the British government through the British High Commissioner in Egypt, McMohan. He was appalled at the changes being wrought in Ottoman Turkey by the rise of the secular godless Young Turks. He felt that the time was ripe to secure the independence of the Arab world from Ottoman rule and to restore an Arab *Khilāfah*, and decided to respond positively to McMohan's plea to him for Arab assistance in the war.

Husain bin Ali decided to revolt, and responded by declaring his independence from Ottoman rule while proclaiming himself King of the Arabs. He did so in a very lengthy and powerfully written proclamation that was issued on June 27<sup>th</sup> 1916. (See text of this important document in Appendix 3). The document appealed to the religious sentiments of Muslims around the world,

but made absolutely no mention of Husain's betrayal of the Qur'ān in forging a divinely-prohibited alliance with Judeo-Christian (Zionist) Britain (see *Qur'ān, al-Mā'idah, 5:51*). It did record for posterity however, the blatantly provocative role played by the secular Turkish nationalists (Committee for Union and progress) who had taken control of government in the Ottoman State in deliberately fanning anti-Ottoman sentiments in Arabia and thus providing convenient fuel for the first 'Arab Spring' to take off.

Students of history will find much to ponder over in this document as well as in such other documents as the exchange of letters between Husain and the British government (through the British High Commissioner). They will find an equal amount that will disgust them in the discovery of deception and falsehood in the conduct of British and French diplomacy in this sorry page of political, diplomatic and religious history.

Since both Husain and Ibn Saūd had entered into alliances with the British during the war, Ibn Saūd could not attempt to take the *Hejāz* while the war lasted. Even after the conclusion of the war, wisdom dictated that he should wait to see what steps the *Khalīfah* in

Constantinople would take to regain control of the *Hejāz*.

It was only when the Ottoman *Khilāfah* was abolished on March 3<sup>rd</sup> 1924 that the time had at last come when he could march against Husain. Husain, of course, was well aware of this, and it was in a vain attempt to muster world Muslim support to strengthen his hands against Ibn Saūd that he claimed the *Khilāfah* for himself on March 7, 1924 - four days after the abolition in Ankara of the Ottoman *Khilāfah*.

1924 turned out to be a most eventful year indeed in the history of Islām. For Ibn Saūd responded to the announcement of Husain's *Khilāfah* by attacking the *Hejāz*. The Najdi forces of Ibn Saūd conquered Tāif on September 5, 1924, Makkah on October 13, and Madina on December 5. One year later, on December 19, 1925, Jeddah was captured and the luckless '*Khalīfah*' and 'King of the Arabs' went into exile. Not surprisingly, the notables of Makkah found it expedient to proclaim Ibn Saūd as King of the *Hejāz*.

The first Zionist-crafted 'Arab Spring' was thus completely successful in achieving its objectives.

*Jaziratul 'arab*, which was now united under Saūdi-*Wahhābi* rule, almost immediately began to assert its claim to leadership of the *Ummah* and, in the process, it provided an alternative route to Muslim unity other than that of the *Khilāfah* - to wit, the route of 'intra-national' Islamic solidarity within a system of sovereign Islamic nation-States. *Dajjāl* was now on his way to success.

The *Saūdi-Wahhābi* rulers of the *Hejāz* were well aware that the world of Islām would never have accepted *Wahhābi* leadership. And hence a *Saūdi-Wahhābi Khilāfah* was impossible. On the other hand, if the Muslims of the world got together and appointed a *Khalīfah*, that would have been a matter fraught with grave danger indeed for the *Saūdi-Wahhābi* rule over the *Hejāz*. It could have resulted in a repetition of the catastrophic experience of more than a century earlier when the *Wahhābis* were driven out of the *Hejāz* by an army sent from Egypt.

As a consequence of the impending threat posed by the *Khilāfah* Congress convened in Cairo in May 1926, the Saūdis began the search for an alternative political institution and forum to the *Khilāfah*. They found it in *Dajjāl's* system of secular nation-States and Islamic

inter-State cooperation and solidarity.<sup>31</sup> The foundations for the new order had already, and quite conveniently so for the *Saūdi-Wahhābis*, been laid with the establishment, by Mustafa Kamal, of the secular Republic of Turkey in the very seat of the Ottoman *Khilāfah*.

It mattered nothing to them that the system of nation-States, which was the political creation of the new secular West, and which constituted the very foundation of the new secular model of society, was in manifest conflict with the Islamic Public Order provisions of the *Shari'ah*. What was important to them was the fact that the system of Islamic nation-States would place the *Saūdi-Wahhābi* rule over the *Hejāz* in a virtually impregnable position. The *Wahhābi* State that had raised the greatest objections to *Bid'ah* (i.e., innovation in religion) was now, itself, proposing the greatest of all *Bid'ah* in the history of the *Ummah!*

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<sup>31</sup> Cf. Faruki, Kamal: *Approaches to Muslim Unity*. Pakistan Horizon. Vol xxv, No 2, pp 3-12 in which he describes this alternative to the Caliphate, or to Pan-Islamism, as Islamic universalism - which relies for unity on the common beliefs and practices of Muslims. Faruqi ignores, however, the quite transparent fact that the Caliphate was founded upon and derived its legitimacy from the very beliefs and practices of the Muslims.

The *Saūdi-Wahhābi* response to the announcement of the Cairo *Khilāfah* Congress of May 1926 was to organize a rival conference that would sabotage it. They named their conference *Mu'tamar al-Alam al-Islāmi* (World Muslim Congress) and convened it in Makkah in July 1926 on the occasion of the *Hajj*. They were diabolically clever in planning the date of the conference since the mode of transport available in 1926 made it quite difficult for many delegates to attend both Conferences. The *Saūdi* strategy forced the Muslim World to choose to attend one or the other of the two Conferences, and since the *Saūdi*-sponsored conference was taking place at the time of the *Hajj*, it had a clear advantage over its rival.

History will one day reveal the extent of British diplomatic and financial support that was given to ensure the success of the plan to sabotage the Cairo Congress.

The very purpose of the *Saūdi*-sponsored conference was to lay the classical Islām Public Order of *Dār al-Islām* and *Khilāfah* to rest while introducing a new system of Islamic nation-States. Within the framework of the new 'intra-national' Islamic Order the *Saūdi*-

*Wahhābis* would seek recognition for their rule over the *Hejāz*.

The *travaux preparatoire* of the conference reveals that the Saūdi leader cunningly projected himself to all the delegates of the conference as a ‘champion’ of Islām who promised to restore authentic Islām to *Jaziratul ‘arab*.

The *Wahhābis*, as we noted earlier, were aware that the world of Islām would never accept a *Wahhābi Khalīfah*. But long before this, Muhammad Abdul Wahhab had himself been influenced by the views of Ibn Taimiyyah. His view was that the *Khilāfah*, because it was not rightly constituted, functioned as an instrument for disunity in the *Ummah*. As such, the *Khilāfah* could not be the symbol and the foundation of Muslim unity. This role must be given to the *Shari‘ah*.

It seemed natural, therefore, that the *Wahhābi Najd* and *Hejāz* should remain aloof from the *Khilāfah* Congress of Cairo. And because of the strategic position they occupied in respect of their newly-won control over the heart-land of Islām, it was predictable that the *Saūdi-Wahhābi* leadership would seek to seize the opportunity provided by the abolition of the Ottoman

*Khilāfah* and the defeat of the short-lived *Sharīfian Khilāfah* to lead the *Ummah* along a new road to unity.<sup>32</sup>

The fact that the date fixed by Ibn Saūd for the World Muslim Congress was June-July 1926 (one month after the Cairo *Khilāfah* Congress) was clearly meant to demonstrate that it was being organized as an alternative to the *Khilāfah* Congress.

There was yet another reason for the decision to convene a World Muslim Congress in Makkah. Ibn Saūd wanted international Islamic recognition of his authority over the heartland of Islām. This was a matter of vital importance to the *Wahhābis* since there were significant religious differences between them and the rest of the world of Islām. These issues transcended the fact that the *Wahhābis* followed the *Hanbali* School of Islamic law and were a tiny minority in a world of Islām dominated by followers of the *Hanafi*, *Shāfeī* and *Māliki* schools of law.<sup>33</sup>

When, in the 18th century, the *Wahhābis* won a short-lived control over the *Hejāz* they perpetrated, in their fanatical zeal, a tremendous blood-bath. There was

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<sup>32</sup> Faruki, Op. cit., pp 3-12

<sup>33</sup> Sunnis recognized all four schools as equally valid.

wide-spread anger and revulsion in the world of Islām and an Egyptian army that was sent to the *Hejāz*, defeated them and drove them out into the wilderness. The second time around, therefore, the *Wahhābis* wanted to ensure that the world of Islām would recognize their rule over the *Hejāz* and *Haramain*.<sup>34</sup> This was the second primary objective for which the World Muslim Congress was convened.

## **The Delegates to the Congress**

The World Muslim Congress that convened in Makkah in June 1926 as a result of the efforts of Ibn Saūd, was hailed as the first such meeting in the history of Islām. Ibn Saūd himself referred to this in his opening address:

“In respect of its form and its objective, your meeting is, without doubt, the first of its kind in the annals of Islām.”<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Until the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the Saūdi-Wahhābis had succeeded in winning this recognition from all the governments of the Islamic nation-States. Among the Muslim masses, however, considerable resentment still exists.

<sup>35</sup> Revue, Op. cit. p.128

From the very beginning it was intended to be a permanent organization:

“We pray to the Almighty that this Congress may meet again and again each year (at the time of the *Hajj*).”<sup>36</sup>

Unlike the *Khilāfah* Congress of Cairo, the Makkah Conference attracted both a representative gathering and a high quality of representation. All the important Islamic communities and all the independent Islamic States (except Persia) were represented. From the South Asian sub-continent came top-level representation of all the important Islamic organizations. For example, Sayyed Sulaiman Nadvi headed the delegation representing the *Khilāfat* Movement of India.<sup>37</sup> The other three members of the delegation were *Maulānā* Muhammad Ali Jauhar, his brother, *Maulānā* Shaukat Ali, and his son-in-law, Shoaib Quraishi. There was a delegation headed by Sayyed Muhammad Kifāyatullah representing the Association of *Ulamā* of India and

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> It was paradoxical that the Caliphate Movement of India should boycott the Caliphate Congress of Cairo in May and attend the World Muslim Congress of Makkah in June from the agenda of which the question of the caliphate was specifically excluded.

another delegation headed by *Shaikh* Sanaullah representing the *Ulamā Ahl al-Hadīth* of India.

The Grand Mufti of Palestine, Sayyed Amīn al-Husseini, headed the Palestinian delegation, General Ghulam Jilani Khan, - the Afghan delegation, Edib Saroit, - the Turkish delegation, *Shaikh* al-Zawāhiri, - the Egyptian delegation and Reazuddīn Fakhruddīn, - the delegation of Russian Muslims. With Fakhruddin on that delegation were delegates from Oufa, Astrakan, Kazan, Crimea, Siberia and Turkistan. Delegates also came from Java, Syria, Sudan, *Najd*, *Hejāz*, Yemen, etc.

A number of individuals were specially invited to the Congress. In this group was *Shaikh* Rashīd Ridā the famous Syrian Islamic scholar who was a student of *Shaikh* Muhammad ‘Abduh, as well as Sardār Iqbāl Ali Shah, the thoroughly westernized London-based Afghan scholar, who wrote a series of articles on the Conference for British publications.<sup>38</sup> The significant absentees from the Conference were Persia, China, the Sanusi of Libya and the rest of the Maghrib.

The composition of the Cairo and the Makkah Conferences differed in another important respect.

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<sup>38</sup> Those articles would make very interesting reading if published today.

Whereas in Cairo no delegation was recognized as being official and all delegates participated in their individual capacities, this was not so at Makkah. To this latter conference the Islamic countries and communities sent official delegations and, in so doing, demonstrated a preference for the Makkah forum and for the new approach to unity. And herein is located a simple, yet fundamental, explanation for the organization of the contemporary world of Islām as a system of nation-States, to wit: the Muslim masses uncritically opted for it because of a number of reasons:

- the dismal objective situation then facing the Muslim World and the need for a tangible response;
- the incapacity of the *Ulamā* to effectively articulate the principles of the Islamic Public Order (i.e., *Khilāfah and Dār al-Islām*) and the Islamic Conception of an International Order within which *Dār al-Islām* was located, and to expose the bogus and fraudulent claim that the modern republican State or oligarchic monarchy could ever be a substitute for the Islamic *Khilāfah*;
- the complete failure of Islamic scholarship to use the Qur'ān to penetrate and understand the reality of the age in which they lived in which not only had most of the world of Islām been subjugated to western Judeo-

Christian colonial rule, but Jerusalem already been lost to the Zionists and the *Khilāfah* had just been abolished. That explanation was of course, located in Islamic eschatology.

## The King and the Congress

The Congress received two messages from King ‘Abdul ‘Azīz ibn Saūd. In the first, the opening address of the Congress, the King made reference to the sorry history of the *Hejāz* ending with the despotism of Husain who, among his other sins, placed the *Hejāz* under ‘foreign non-Muslim influence’.<sup>39</sup> This being prohibited by the Prophet (sallallahu ‘alaihi wa sallam), a justification was therefore presented for the *Najdi* conquest of the *Hejāz*. The King was pleased to point out that as a result of that conquest there was now security in the *Hejāz*. The Congress was invited to hold its sessions in that atmosphere of security and of total liberty. The only constraints on the conference were the restraints of the Islamic Law and of *not meddling in international politics or in the differences which separate certain Muslim peoples from their governments*.<sup>40</sup> And yet Ibn Saūd was

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<sup>39</sup> A reference to Husain’s ties with the British.

<sup>40</sup> Revue, Op. cit. pp. 128-131.

less than honest in his opening statement since he was just as guilty as was Husain bin 'Ali in aiding and abetting the penetration of British influence in the peninsula. He was a British client who was receiving a monthly sum of 5000 pounds from the British government.

Two things stand out in the King's address. Firstly the *Wahhābi* leadership was showing its best possible face in order to court the support of the Congress, - thus the 'security' and 'total liberty' promised. But secondly, and more important, the ban on international politics in the discussions of the Congress clearly implied that the security of the *Saūdi-Wahhābi* State and the maintenance of its relations with its allies (Britain, in particular) took precedence over the considered opinions of the *Ummah* even when expressed through *Shūrah* in an Islamic Conference 'unprecedented' in the history of Islām.

The King gave to the Congress the 'safe' task of *examining the necessary ways and means for making the holy places the best centers of Islamic culture and education, the most perfect region in terms of prosperity*

*and hygiene, and the Muslim country which is most conspicuous for its recognition of Islām.*<sup>41</sup>

It was very clear from this address that the King was attempting to foist on the Congress an artificial division between 'religion' and 'politics', and a new theory to the effect that the proper subject matter for the consideration of Islamic Congresses was the subject matter of 'religion' and 'religious affairs'. And this was a *Bid'ah* of a truly reprehensible nature since it was in such manifest conflict with the Qur'ānic guidance, the *Sunnah* of the Prophet and the very foundations of the Islamic Public Order. The King was, in fact, making an attempt to secularize *al-Islām*, which was *al-Dīn*, into 'religion' in the narrow and distorted sense in which the term was used in secular western civilization. In other words he was attempting foist upon the heartland of Islām the western concept of separation of religion from politics.

On July 2nd 1926, on the occasion of the 15th plenary session, the King addressed a second message to the Congress, through which he sought to achieve one of the main objectives of the *Wahhābi* initiative, to wit, the

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<sup>41</sup> Revue, Op. cit. pp 128-31

international Islamic recognition and acceptance of *Saūdi-Wahhābi* political control over the *Hejāz*.

The King expounded his *politique* for the *Hejāz* as follows:

1. We do not admit any foreign intervention in this sacred country - whatever may be its nature.
2. We do not admit any privileges open to some and denied to others; whatever takes place in this country must conform with the *Shari'ah*.
3. The *Hejāz* must have a special neutral regime. It must neither make war nor be attacked; and all the independent Muslim States must guarantee this neutrality.
4. There is need for examining the question of financial aid which comes (to the *Hejāz*) from many Islamic countries, the manner of distribution and the (need to ensure the) benefit to the holy places.<sup>42</sup>

What the King was attempting to do in this address was nothing less than propounding a new Islamic political theory. It was as though the *Saūdi-Wahhābis* were convinced that they were the only Muslims, and

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<sup>42</sup> Revue, Op. cit.

hence *Hejāz* and *Najd*, which were under their control, was the real *Dār al-Islām*. Thus all territories outside of *Hejāz* and *Najd* (or modern Saūdi Arabia) were 'foreign'. And when the King spoke about the need to prevent any 'foreign' intervention in the *Hejāz*, he was referring specifically to the kind of intervention that had ousted the *Wahhābis* from the *Hejāz* more than a century earlier. In referring to the rest of the world of Islām as 'foreign', the King was quite close to committing an act of *Kufr*.

The second point made was, of course, quite admirable i.e., a non-discriminatory application of the injunctions of the *Shari'ah*. But the second point was incompatible with the first. The rest of the world of Islām was being accorded the status of 'foreigners' who, naturally, would not be eligible to all the privileges open to the *Saūdi-Wahhābis*. Foreigners, for example, would need a visa in order to enter the *Hejāz* - even for performing the *Hajj*. The *Saūdi-Wahhābis* would not require a visa since they were citizens of the about-to-be-created State of Saūdi Arabia, and so the *Hejāz* belonged to them. Non-Saūdi Muslims could now be imprisoned if they extended their stay in *Hejāz* after the expiry of their visas, - for they were now foreigners and

the *Hejāz*, which was no longer *Dār al-Islām*, did not belong to them. *Saūdi-Wahhābis* could stay in the *Hejāz* as long as they wished since the *Hejāz* now belonged to them.

The King had, in fact, dismantled the *Dār al-Islām* which had been established by the Prophet himself, and by his companions, in the *Hejāz*, had dispossessed the world of Islām of its very heartland, had insulted the Muslims, and was destined to get away with that audacious behavior for, perhaps, as much as a hundred years.

The third point made in the King's address was quite remarkable. There could be no doubt at all that it was a manifest statement of *Bid'ah*. Neither in the Qur'ān, nor in the *Sunnah* of the Prophet, nor in the entire Islamic legacy was there any concept of the 'neutrality' of the *Hejāz*. Indeed the statement that the *Hejāz* must not make war amounted to taking the very heartland of Islām out of *Jihād*, and was thus in manifest conflict with explicit commands of the Qur'ān. Here again the King was walking the path of *Kufr*.

In respect of the request of the King that all independent Islamic States should recognize the 'neutrality' of his regime, it was clear that this was a

scarcely disguised attempt to win recognition from the world of Islām of *Saūdi-Wahhābi* rule over the *Hejāz*.

The conference responded to the address of the King by making free but intelligent use of the freedom that the King offered. Delegates spoke freely and candidly and, as a perusal of the Verbatim Report of the conference reveals, nothing appears to have been 'stage-managed' by the regime. Indeed, on occasions the delegates of the *Hejāz* found themselves outvoted<sup>43</sup>

By and large, the conference stayed within the limitations imposed on it by not meddling in international politics. As such the subject of the *Khilāfah* was never discussed. This was a major triumph for the new approach to Muslim unity. The conference did,

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<sup>43</sup> For example, the conference approved the project of building two railway lines from Jeddah to Makkah and from Yanbu to Madina despite the strong opposition of the *Hejāzi* delegates "who had religious objections to the construction of railways in a country in which life depends on the camel." Revue, Op. cit. p.193. How one wished that the Saūdi *ulamā* could have articulated their objections to the railway in the context of it constituting a substitute which would displace the mode of transport which Allah had created. The Saūdi authorities would then have become conscious of the danger which modern technology posed and would have made provision to preserve natural transport alongside mechanized transport.

however, enter into politics in approving a resolution<sup>44</sup> demanding the return of *Maʿān* and *Aqaba* to *Hejāzi* control since the British annexation of these territories to Transjordan (over which Britain was the mandate power) violated what Rashīd Ridā claimed to be the command of the Prophet that the Arabian Peninsula must remain free of all non-Islamic influence.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Text of the resolution in *Revue*, Op. cit. pp 207-8. Egypt, Turkey and Afghanistan abstained in the vote.

<sup>45</sup> According to Toynbee: "...one of the effects of the war of 1914-18 was to eliminate the Turks from Arabia and to extend the British sphere of influence over the whole peninsula (*Survey*, Op. cit. p 272) But it is very important to note that in this unique and momentous achievement of the British in which the command of the Prophet was compromised for the first time in thirteen hundred years, the British were aided and abetted by both Husain and Ibn Saūd. Indeed both commanded a price for their services to Britain. The Arab forces of Husain actually fought alongside the British against the Turks. Ibn Saūd's benevolent neutrality in this struggle enhanced the chances of Britain's success. Up to 1920 when his monthly payments from the British were stopped, Husain had received about six million pounds sterling. Ibn Saūd, who received from the same British Government a more modest 350,000 pounds at the rate of 5000 pounds a month, diabolically explained it away as *jizyah* (a tax paid by a subject non-Muslim people resident in the territory of *Dar al-Islam*)". *Survey*, Op. cit. p.273. It was Britain (the mandate power in Transjordan) which had annexed Maan and Aqaba to Transjordan in 1925. Although ex-King Husain protested

When Ibn Saūd himself brought international politics into the Congress with the exposition of his *politique* for the *Hejāz*, the Congress debated the issue at length and then displayed its wisdom, integrity and faithfulness to authentic Islām by denying the King the recognition he was seeking. The Congress decided to simply ‘note’ the statement of the King. And this was, perhaps, the single most important decision taken by a

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the annexation from his exile in Cyprus and Ibn Saūd moved the World Muslim Congress to adopt a resolution protesting the annexation, the British action was clearly a *fait accompli*. It is interesting to note that if the command of the Prophet (sallallahu ‘alaihi wa sallam) had not been compromised by Husain and Ibn Saūd in their misguided assistance to the British and in the attempt to rid the peninsula of Ottoman influence, it would not have been possible for the Balfour Declaration to be fulfilled and for the Zionist State to be established in Muslim Palestine. It is also interesting to note that if *Aqaba* had remained under *Hejāzi* control, Saudi Arabia would have been a front-line State in the present Middle East conflict. History may one day reveal that one of the reasons for the British annexation of Ma’an and Aqaba was to create a buffer zone between the volatile heartland of Islam and the Jewish national home in Palestine which the Balfour Declaration envisaged. It should be clear that a direct confrontation between the *Hejāz* (now part of Saudi Arabia) and the Jewish National Home in Palestine (now the State of Israel) would arouse uncontrollable Islamic passions, a factor which still constitutes the only serious threat to the survival of the Zionist State.

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representative body of the *Ummah* since the abolition of the Ottoman *Khilāfah*.

It was a bitter blow indeed for Ibn Saūd, and the result was that the Congress remained dormant for the next twenty years and was never again to meet in Makkah where, it was agreed, it would be meeting annually at the time of the *Hajj*.

On another volatile issue, however, the Congress found it prudent to yield to the wishes of their host. Ibn Saūd had drawn to the attention of the Congress, in his capacity as one of the Muslim Heads of State, that although all Muslims were free to worship in the Holy Land according to the rights of their respective legal schools, the *Wahhābi* administration would not tolerate any behavior that was in conflict with the *Shari'ah*. This issue provoked one of the most heated discussions in the Congress. *Shaikh* al-Zawāhiri saved the day by presenting a compromise draft resolution that confined itself to demanding freedom of rites but did not enter into the controversial area of the repair of tombs of companions of the Prophet that had been destroyed by the *Wahhābis*, etc.

The issue had struck at the heart of *Wahhābis* and although it had not been allowed to develop into a crisis,

the delegates exercising the greatest prudence in not pressing Ibn Saūd too hard, all the same the Indian delegates left with bitter feelings. This, in part, explains why the Congress did not meet again in Makkah, as had been agreed upon.

We cannot end this chapter without noting that ‘Abdul ‘Aziz ibn Saud did finally succeed in getting the universal recognition of Saudi rule over Hejaz that he sought. All that he had to do was to proclaim the establishment of the State of Saudi Arabia and institute the legal requirement of a Saudi visa for entry into the territory of the State – even if such entry were for performance of the *Hajj*.

[This writer finds himself almost alone in his refusal to submit to such *Bid’ah*, and he has therefore put aside in *Dinars* the money required for the performance of his *Hajj*. If he dies before Saudi rule over the *Hejāz* is consigned to the garbage-bin of history, he prays that on that day when once again: “and thou art free in this city (i.e., Makkah)” (Qur’an, al-Balad, 90:2) that someone will perform the *Hajj* on his behalf. *Amīn!*]

The Indian Muslim leader, *Maulānā* Shaukat Ali, played the leading role in organizing the third major Islamic conference in 1931, after the two conferences in 1926. And he had no hesitation whatsoever in by-

passing Makkah and agreeing upon Jerusalem as its venue.

Some of the most beneficial work of the Makkah Congress concerned the improvement of conditions for the *Hajj*, transportation (in particular the *Hejāz* railway), medical facilities, availability of food and water, protection from exploitation, etc. These were matters that affected pilgrims every year and on these matters the Congress deliberated at length and adopted many useful resolutions.



## CHAPTER FIVE

*But the old orthodox Jews in Jerusalem, who lived and worked quite apart from the Zionists, greeted the Congress at the beginning and wished it all success. They stated that the Jews did not want the holy places and had no right to them; but they entreated the Congress not to oppose the old Jewish custom of praying at the Wailing Wall. The Congress did precisely that!*

### *The old world of Islām - a last attempt at revival*

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#### **The General Islamic Congress Jerusalem of December 1931**

For five years after the two conferences of 1926 no other significant collective attempt was made by the world of Islām to respond to the collapse of the *Khilāfah* and to other momentous, challenging and dangerous changes which were sweeping that world. The final last

gasp of the dying *Dār al-Islām* occurred at the General Islamic Congress that was held in Jerusalem in December 1931, on the basis of an Indo-Palestinian effort.<sup>46</sup> It did have within its bosom the cherished desire of restoring some semblance of integrity to the collapsing old order left by the Prophet (sallallahu ‘alahi wa sallam). But it failed to achieve anything. Like the Cairo and Makkah Congresses it appeared to have been still-born.

To the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, *Hajj* Amīn al-Hussaini, the ominous advances of Zionism in Muslim Palestine between 1926 and 1931 presented a threat to Islām. This threat could not be met except by the united world of Islām. And it was a measure of the simplicity, *naivete* and innocence of the contemporary Islamic thought that he could argue that another Islamic conference, to be convened in British-occupied Jerusalem, would be the appropriate way to meet the

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<sup>46</sup> It is wrong to assert (as the World Muslim Congress of Karachi now does) that the Islamic conference held in Jerusalem in 1931 was the second session of the World Muslim Congress (the first being held in Makkah in 1926). Firstly the Jerusalem Congress chose a name for itself different from “World Muslim Congress”. Article One of the Statute of the Congress named it as “General Islamic Congress” (al-Mu’tamar al-Islāmi al-’Ām). Secondly, the Congress adopted a Statute of its own - different from the Statute of the World Muslim Congress.

threat. Salahuddin Ayyubi must have rolled in his grave. It appeared as though the world of Islamic scholarship had lost sight of the firm relationship that the Qur'ān had established between *power, freedom and faith*.

In August 1929 there were riots between Muslims and Jews over the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. The League of Nations sent a Commission to investigate the matter and the Commission's findings were that Muslims possessed *property rights* over the Wailing Wall but that Jews possessed the *right to worship* before it. This report pleased neither Muslims nor Jews and could be said to have led indirectly to the call for an Islamic conference.

In early 1931, on the occasion of the burial within the precincts of the *Haram al-Sharīf*, Jerusalem, of the Indian Muslim leader *Maulānā* Muhammad Ali Jawhar<sup>47</sup> agreement was reached between his brother, *Maulānā* Shaukat Ali, and *Hajj* Amin al Hussaini on the need to convene a conference. A few months later, in June 1931,

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<sup>47</sup> Muhammad Ali Jauhar had actually died in London where he was participating in the Round Table Conference on India. The Palestinians moved for him to be buried in the *Haram al-Sharīf* partly out of recognition of his greatness and partly to win greater Indian support in the struggle against Zionism and the British 'Mandate' power.

the report of the Wailing Wall Commission was published and the Supreme Muslim Council of Palestine then made the public call for the conference.

The formal announcement on agreement to convene the conference and the decision on the date for the conference was made on September 4, 1931, by *Maulānā* Shaukat Ali, in an address after the midday prayer in *Masjid al-Aqsa*, Jerusalem. The Indian Muslims can now be said to have attained a position of unique and extraordinary importance and leadership in the world of Islām.

## The Date and Venue

The General Islamic Congress was held in Jerusalem from 6<sup>th</sup> to 16<sup>th</sup> December 1931. This corresponds to 27<sup>th</sup> *Rajab* – 7<sup>th</sup> *Shabān* in the Islamic Calendar. We may note in passing that the reference to the Islamic calendar is significant as was the choice of the *Masjid al-Aqsa* as the venue for the opening session of the Congress on 27<sup>th</sup> *Rajab*.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> There is an important link between 27<sup>th</sup> *Rajab*, *Masjid al-Aqsa* and the Wailing Wall, a link which moves emotions very powerfully in the world of Islam. The explanation is as follows: The seventeenth chapter of the Qur'ān, entitled *Sūrah al-Isra*, commences with a

Now whereas the *Khilāfah* Congress took place in a nominally independent Egypt which was within the British sphere of influence, and the World Muslim Congress was convened in a nominally independent *Hejāz* which was also firmly within the British sphere of influence, the Aqsa Islamic Congress was to take place in territory which was under direct British mandate rule. Jerusalem did not have as much as a ‘fig leaf’ to cover its status as occupied territory. Some would even argue that such occupied territory would have the status of *Dār al-Harb!*

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verse which refers to the miraculous night-journey of the Prophet Muhammad from the *Masjid al-Harām* (the sacred mosque, Makkah) to the *Masjid al-Aqsa* (the distant mosque, Jerusalem) the precincts of which, according to the verse, have been blessed by Allah took him on the journey so that He could show him some of His ‘Signs’. The *Hadīth* literature states that upon arrival in *Masjid al-Aqsa* he led a congregational prayer in which all the Prophets participated. Subsequently he was transported into the heavens and was honored with an experience of entry into the special presence of Allah. The Wailing Wall or Western Wall forms a part of the *Haram al-Sharīf* which houses *Masjid al-Aqsa* as well as the spot from which the Prophet’s heavenly journey commenced. It is generally believed that this journey took place on 27th Rajab. (Mishkat al-Masabih), English translation by James Robson, Lahore, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1975, vol.2, Ch. 23, Book 26 pp. 1264-70.

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It must have been a most extraordinary spectacle indeed for the world of Islām to gather in a World Islamic Congress within occupied territory to seek to restore the Public Law dimension of the *Shari'ah*. In this respect the General Islamic Congress of Jerusalem was unique and unprecedented in the entire history of Islām. In fact, this revealed the pathetic state to which the world of Islām had been reduced. The British Government was probably most surprised of all with this development. In so far as the British were concerned the world of Islām would be putting its impotence on public display. A gleeful British Government simply restricted itself to having its High Commissioner warn *Hajj* Amin al-Husaini that the Government would not allow the convening of a Congress at which questions might be raised affecting the internal and external affairs of friendly powers.<sup>49</sup>

The Zionist press, on the other hand, reacted with great apprehension to the call for the Congress, accusing the British Government of allowing the Congress because “she really wanted the conference, nay, she

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<sup>49</sup> Gibb, H.A.R., “The Islamic Conference in Jerusalem in December 1931.” *Survey of International Affairs*, London, Oxford University Press, 1935. p. 103.

provoked it in order to satisfy the Muslims of Palestine and India and to counteract the Zionist Movement.”<sup>50</sup>

One also had to take into consideration the very strong feeling voiced by many that the Congress would attempt to re-instate Abdul Majīd as *Khalīfah* with his seat in Jerusalem. Such a move could have a destabilizing effect on the Angora (now Ankara) regime, - and a *Khalīfah* in Jerusalem, subject to the authority of the British King, would also be something which Great Britain would welcome and could exploit to tremendous advantage.<sup>51</sup> It would, for example, make of Islam the laughing stock of the rest of the world. [More than 80 years later, another Arab Spring now threatens to restore precisely such a bogus *Khilāfah*.]

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<sup>50</sup> Nielsen, A. “The Islamic Conference at Jerusalem.” *The Muslim World*, October 1932, vol 22 p 348.

<sup>51</sup> King Fuad of Egypt, in particular, was so perturbed over the rumors that the Caliphate question would be discussed and a Caliph proclaimed that the Grand Mufti had to visit Cairo in person and give both verbal and written assurances that the question would not be discussed. For *Maulānā* Shaukat Ali, on the other hand, there was no Caliphate question since he continued to recognize ‘Abdul Majīd as Caliph. (Arnold, T. Op. cit. pp.241-4).

## Delegates

The Congress did take place in an atmosphere fairly free of restrictions, and apart from the expulsion of the Egyptian, 'Abd al-Rahmān 'Azzam, on account of his severe criticism of Italian policy in Libya, the British authorities in Palestine did not interfere in any way with the Congress nor did they place any restrictions on attendance.

Delegates to the Congress came from Persia (some Shia *Ulamā*), India (among whose delegates was the great Muslim scholar and thinker, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal), Yugoslavia, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Syria and Nigeria. Although the Egyptian Government finally decided not to send any official delegation, there were Egyptian delegates present to support the King. They were opposed by a delegation representing the *Wafd* party of Egypt. A number of other Islamic movements in Egypt were also represented.

The Governments of Iraq and Transjordan sent official delegations. The Saūdi monarch, 'Abd al-'Azīz ibn-Saūd, vacillated in his attitude towards the Congress and finally and cleverly sent a representative who was unable to reach Jerusalem in time to participate in the Congress. Turkey and Afghanistan declined to take part

in the Congress. Compared, therefore, with the Makkah Congress of July 1926, there was a sharp drop in the participation of official governmental delegations at the Jerusalem Congress.

## **The Work of the Congress**

After the formal opening of the Congress in the Masjid al-Aqsa after the sunset prayers on December 6 (27th Rajab),<sup>52</sup> eight committees were formed to study and report on the following matters:

- The Statute of the Congress
- Congress propaganda and publications
- Finance and organization
- Muslim culture and the proposed Islamic University of al-Aqsa
- The *Hejāz* railway
- The Holy Places and the Wailing Wall

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<sup>52</sup> In the Islamic system the day begins at sunset and ends at the following sunset. Thus Rajab 27 (or Lailatul Miraj) did not begin until sunset on December 6.

- Islamic propaganda and guidance
- Proposals laid before the Congress.

Like the Makkah Congress of 1926, the Jerusalem Congress adopted a Statute or Charter. The Makkah Statute had called for annual meetings in Makkah. The Jerusalem Statute called for biennial meetings in Jerusalem. A small secretariat was also established in Jerusalem (as was done in Makkah). The Jerusalem Secretariat continued to function for a few years but the Congress itself never met again.<sup>53</sup>

The Congress decided that an Islamic University should be built in Jerusalem. The decision was taken despite the considerable jealousy aroused from al-Azhar University which did not welcome the creation of a

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<sup>53</sup> Gibb, H.A.R., Op. cit. p.105. The Jerusalem Congress was revived in 1953 and three conferences were held in 1953, 1956 and 1960. It has never again met since 1960. This was partly because the President of the Jerusalem Congress, *Hajj* Amin al-Husseini, became the President of a revived World Muslim Congress as well. He preferred to work with the latter organization since it enjoyed the political support of the Pakistan Government and the financial support of the Saudi Government.

competitor to its unique position in the world of Islamic learning.<sup>54</sup>

But the most important matter that engaged the attention of the Congress was, without doubt, the Zionist threat in Palestine. The attitude and approach of the Conference to the volatile subject was remarkably broad-minded and objective. The President of the Jewish Agency, Mr. Sokolow, was invited to attend the Congress for the purpose of explaining the Zionist point of view. The invitation, extended by Shaukat Ali, was refused. And in the Zionist press militant Zionism mocked and ridiculed the Congress.<sup>55</sup>

There was another section of Zionists, more peaceful than the first group, who had set up the Hebrew University. These Zionists spoke with more dignity about the Congress although they, too, criticized Britain just as strongly as the other Zionists for having permitted the Congress to discuss British policy in Palestine.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Gibb, *Op. cit.*, p 102.

<sup>55</sup> Nielsen, *Op. cit.* p. 353

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

But the old orthodox Jews in Jerusalem, who lived and worked quite apart from the Zionists, greeted the Congress at the beginning and wished it all success. They stated that the Jews did not want the holy places and had no right to them; but they entreated the Congress not to oppose the old Jewish custom of praying at the Wailing Wall.<sup>57</sup>

The Congress did precisely that! It rejected the League of Nation's Wailing Wall Commission's report which confirmed Muslim ownership of the Wailing Wall but upheld the right of the Jews to pray at the Wall.<sup>58</sup> In so doing the Congress alienated the orthodox Jews and weakened their hands (i.e. the orthodox Jews) in their struggle again the Zionists.<sup>59</sup>

The Congress protested to the League of Nations the encroachment of rights and reminded the League of the assistance given by the Arabs to the Allies in the first

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<sup>57</sup> Nielsen, Op. cit. p 353

<sup>58</sup> Full text of the report appended to the Palestine (Western or Wailing Wall), Order in Council 1931 as Schedules 1 and 2. See Statutory Rules and Orders for 1931. H M Stationery Office, London. 1932. pp. 462-6

<sup>59</sup> This attitude was further concretely expressed during the period 1948-1967 when East Jerusalem was under Jordanian control.

World-War. No one present appeared to have realized that such Muslim assistance to Britain, France and their allies in the first World-War violated Allah's command in the Qur'an.

The Congress warned that "mandate" did not mean the subjugation of the Arabs and the usurpation of their rights. The Congress did not reject the principle of Jewish immigration into Palestine and the purchasing of land and property. Implicitly, therefore, the Congress recognized the right of Jews to enter and to live in Palestine and to own property there. In the context, however, of the Zionist plan of establishing a Jewish National Home in Palestine, the Congress responded by proposing the establishment of an Agricultural Bank that would render financial support for landed peasants and agriculturists in order to strengthen the resistance to the Zionist efforts to buy their land.

The response of the Congress to the Zionist threat may be considered to have been moderate. This contrasted sharply to the Arab nationalist response. Indeed the Congress resisted the pressure of the Arab nationalists to adopt a more militant position. The Arab nationalists met separately during the Congress and formulated an "Arab Covenant" which was a predictable

response to Jewish nationalism;<sup>60</sup> the one, indeed, was the counterpart of the other.<sup>61</sup>

The Congress failed to perceive, however, that the Islamic religious response should have included an active strategy to build a common religious front with those Jews who opposed Zionism and who were friendly towards the Muslims.<sup>62</sup> The Qur'ān prohibited the establishment of friendship and alliance with only those

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<sup>60</sup> “The Arab lands are a complete and indivisible whole, and divisions of whatever nature to which they have been subjected are neither approved nor recognized by the Arab nation ...” Gibb, *Op. cit.* p.107 fn.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Marmorstein, Emile: “Religious Opposition to Nationalism in the Middle East.” *International Affairs*, July 1952, pp. 344-357.

<sup>62</sup> Among the orthodox Jews was the scholar, Prof Jacob de Haan. He was killed by the Zionists because of his stinging denunciation of Zionism. In an important interview in the early twenties he explained his viewpoint as follows: “Do you think that history is but a series of accidents? I don’t... The Zionists suffer from the same spiritual blindness that caused our downfall. The two thousand years of Jewish exile and unhappiness have taught them nothing. Instead of making an attempt to understand the innermost causes of our unhappiness, they are trying to circumvent it, as it were, by building a “National Home” on foundations provided by Western power politics. And in the process of building that “National Home” they are committing the crime of depriving another people of their home.” Asad, Muhammad, *Road to Mecca*. pp. 98-9.

Jews and Christians who were allies of each other. It did not prohibit friendship and alliance with other Jews and Christians.<sup>63</sup>

What was particularly disappointing was the failure of the Congress, sitting right there in the holy city of Jerusalem, to make a realistic appraisal of the very bleak objective situation then facing the world of Islām, and to courageously and creatively formulate a coherent and intelligent long-term strategy for restoring power to the *Ummah*.

In the midst of all the excited and heated political discussions of the Congress, one voice stood out as the voice of the statesman and the sage. Dr. Muhammad

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يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لَا تَتَّخِذُوا الْيَهُودَ وَالنَّصَارَىٰ أَوْلِيَاءَ بَعْضُهُمْ  
أَوْلِيَاءُ بَعْضٍ وَمَنْ يَتَوَلَّهُمْ مِّنْكُمْ فَإِنَّهُ مِنْهُمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَهْدِي الْقَوْمَ  
الظَّالِمِينَ

“Oh you who believe, do not take (such) Jews and (such) Christians as your friends and allies who (themselves) are friends and allies of each other. And whoever from amongst you turns to them for friendship and alliance belong to them (and not to the Muslim community). Surely Allah does not guide a wicked people.”

(Qur’ān, al-Māidah, 5:51)

Iqbal had the vision to warn that the worst dangers facing Islām were not the nefarious designs of Zionism, the greed of the imperial powers, and so on, but atheistic materialism and territorial patriotism. Unless these were resisted, decay in Islām would set in.<sup>64</sup>

But while it was true that Iqbāl had the vision of the great philosophical dangers, such as materialism, looming ahead of Islamic civilization, it would appear that he was as yet incapable of theoretically reformulating the Islamic Public Order (or *Dār al-Islām*) and Islām's conception of an International Order and then articulating it in such a way as would convincingly demonstrate its superiority over the secular rival which was now challenging it. The truth of the matter is that Iqbāl did not know in 1931 what steps should have been taken to respond to the challenge facing the *Ummah*! He was profoundly misguided in his understanding of Islamic eschatology and, as a consequence, could not penetrate the reality which confronted the *Ummah* in the wake of the abolition of the Islamic *Khilāfah*. (See my publication entitled 'Iqbal and Pakistan's Moment of Truth'.)

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<sup>64</sup> The Near East and India. December 24, 1931. p 687

## Post Congress Activities

The Congress elected an Executive Committee<sup>65</sup> which functioned diligently for one year. Branches of the Organization were formed in different countries and representatives of these branches met in Jerusalem in August 1932 to discuss ways and means for the collection of funds. In 1933 Amin al-Hussaini and Altabah Pasha went on a tour of Iraq and India in order to collect funds. They did not succeed and so neither the University nor the Agricultural Bank (to help the peasants) were established.

The second meeting of the Congress that, according to the Statute, should have taken place in November 1933 did not take place. Except for a sudden spur of activity by the Executive Committee in “conflict-mediation” in 1934<sup>66</sup> and a short-lived revival in the fifties, the General Islamic Congress of Jerusalem also died a natural death.

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<sup>65</sup> Shaukat Ali was unhappy about the composition of the Committee and declined to serve on it. *Hajj* Amin had used his majority to exclude opponents among who were capable men.

<sup>66</sup> The Executive Committee successfully mediated a seven week war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. A treaty was eventually signed ending the war.

The Secretariat established by the Congress in 1931 continued to function in Jerusalem until the second World-War. It could not, however, survive the adverse wartime conditions and the direct confrontation between *Hajj* Amīn and the British. *Hajj* Amīn fled to Egypt at the beginning of the war.

The General Islamic Congress of Jerusalem of 1931 failed for the same reasons as the *Khilāfah* Congress and the World Muslim Congress of 1926. It was unable to theoretically articulate a way out of the morass in which the world of Islām had fallen. It was intellectually incapable of responding to the challenge of the political secularism of an arrogant and confident western civilization that was foisting on an intellectually stagnant world of Islām a system of secular nation-States to replace *Dār al-Islām*.

The demise of the *Khilāfah* witnessed the end of a system of political organization that was indigenous to the *Ummah*, and which recognized the supremacy of Islām in public life. The emergence of the secular *Saūdi-Wahhābi* nation-State in the very heart-land of Islām meant that the world of Islām was now going to be secularized. Islam would now be relegated to being a matter of private life, and only a cosmetic application of

the Shariah would hence-forth be possible. The non-political *Tabligh Jamaat* and the pro-regime Saūdi *Salafis* would now attempt fill the void. And ‘Abdullah Yūsuf ‘Ali’s ‘politically correct’ translation of the Qur’ān would be popularized amongst an unsuspecting generation of Muslims who would be increasingly ignorant of Islam’s conception of State and of an international order.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Abdullah Yusuf Ali was a literary genius of English language and literature. His translation of the Qur’ān was largely based on reproducing in English, the magnificent literary accomplishment of Urdu-language scholars of *Tafsīr*. He was somewhat naive in his understanding of the political and economic guidance in the Qur’ān. His supreme and unwavering loyalty to the British government led to a mind-set which rendered him incapable of grasping the elementary fact that Allah sent the perfected religion of Islam to be supreme over both private and public life. He also failed to recognize bank interest as *Ribā*. See M. A. Sharif’s biography of Abdullah Yusuf Ali entitled: *Searching for Solace*. Islamic Book Trust. Kuala Lumpur. 1994.



## Conclusion

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*“The destruction of Islam’s unitary Khilāfah State and its replacement with a fragmented assortment of secular States that are all controlled by a Zionist-created United Nations Organization was the result of Dajjāl’s diabolical conspiracy hatched by the British and the Zionist Jews. The Saūdi-Wahhābis acted as willing accomplices to that crime against the Ummah.”*

The *Khilāfah* symbolized a system of political organization (i.e., *Dār al-Islām*) that recognized the supremacy of Islām in public life and in the international relations of the Muslim world.

The emergence of the secular nation-states of Turkey and Saūdi Arabia at the seat of the *Khilāfah* and in the very heart-land of Islām, paved the way for the secularization of the system of political organization of the Muslim world. And since it was governments of secular nation-States within the Muslim world that would now represent the world of Islām, the implication

was that Islām would no longer be supreme over public life or over the international relations of the Muslim world. In so far as public life in the Muslim world was concerned, Allah would no longer be *Akbar!* By the time Pakistan was born in 1947 the Saudi dye was already cast and Islam's *Khilāfah* State was firmly confined to the museums of history. No Pakistani statesman, politician, political party or intellectual could hope to survive if he were to launch a struggle for the restoration of Islam's *Khilāfah* State.

No Muslim can read these lines without feeling great anger against those who betrayed Allah and the Prophet! The quality of faith (*Imān*) of a Muslim can be gauged through the manner in which he responds to this pathetic situation. The destruction of Islam's unitary *Khilāfah* State and its replacement with a fragmented assortment of secular States that are all controlled by a Zionist-created United Nations organization was the result of *Dajjāl's* diabolical conspiracy hatched by the British and the Zionist Jews. The *Saūdi-Wahhābis* acted as willing accomplices to that crime against the *Ummah*.

The world of Islām is today without power. Our conclusion is that the institution of the *Khilāfah*, which forms part of *Dār al-Islām*, is indispensable for the

restoration of power. Without power there will be many more Bosnias, Kashmirs, Algerias, Chechnyas, Palestines etc. The only way this deplorable state of affairs can be changed is through the restoration of the supremacy of Islām in the public life of Muslims and in the international relations of the Muslim world. That requires the restoration of *Dār al-Islām* and the *Khilāfah*. We need, therefore, to articulate anew the provisions of the Islamic Public Order (*Dār al-Islām*) and Islām's Conception of an International Order (*Pax Islamica*), and to demonstrate their clear superiority over the secular rival which has emerged from western civilization.

We also need to recognize, as this book has made clear, that it is impossible, and will remain impossible, to restore the *Khilāfah* so long as the *Hejāz* remains under the control of the *Saūdi-Wahhābi* alliance. Power cannot be restored without the liberation of the *Haramain* and the *Hajj* from the control of those who participated in the destruction of the *Khilāfah*.

The liberation of the *Haramain* and the *Hajj* will be facilitated when the *Saūdi-Wahhābi* alliance breaks down. There are indications that the alliance is under great pressure and can fall apart. There are many Saūdi *Ulamā* who now imprisoned or under house arrest. The

issue which is most likely to tear the alliance apart would be Saūdi 'recognition' of the Jewish State of Israel, - hence the importance of our book entitled: *'The Religion of Abraham and the State of Israel'*, in which we analyze, from a purely Islamic religious perspective, the implications for Muslims of the 'recognition' of the Zionist State of Israel.

Those who devote their lives to a sincere struggle for the restoration of Islam's *Khilāfah* State can be easily recognized by their political behavior. They do not endorse, or signal their acceptance of the modern State that has replaced the *Khilāfah* State by contesting elections or voting in elections of that State.

END

## APPENDIX 1

Memoirs of Talaat Pasha (1874-1921) published posthumously in 1921:

“After the disasters of Turkey in 1913, she was left without a friend among the European nations.

Russia then began a series of exactions, and Britain abandoned us to Russia. In this strait Germany alone assisted us, and by her protection enabled us to escape or at least postpone the Russian demands.

This amiable attitude on the part of Germany encouraged us to suggest to the German Ambassador at the Porte that we might enter a permanent alliance with Germany. But while the ambassador seemed most favourable to this, the Berlin government was not. It answered in effect that Turkey was too weak, and that an alliance at the moment would be detrimental to both governments.

This, in fact, explains our failure to find an ally anywhere. The European powers wished for only powerful allies, who could help rather than be a burden.

In June, 1914, however, we were surprised by an approach from the German government, which suggested that the project for an alliance be again considered. As we were in the same unhappy

isolation as before, there seemed no reason for refusing this proposal.

The alliance was discussed in a series of meetings with the German ambassador [Note: Wangenheim], and agreement proved easy. A preliminary document was then prepared and signed, outlining the main points of the alliance, which was to be both military and political.

Just afterward there followed the series of events which culminated in the World-War . We realized that Germany's change of attitude toward us must be due to her having foreseen some such warfare; but we still thought the alliance would benefit us. No European power would have welcomed us without expecting something valuable in return.

During the opening months of the War our position was very difficult. Practically we were already allied with Germany, and every day the German and Austrian ambassadors came to me urging our immediate entrance into the War. It would have been easy to have evaded them by pointing out that Italy, though a member of their alliance, had not joined them, or by showing that in invading Belgium, Germany had ignored her own signature to an alliance.

But we were unwilling to break away completely from the partnership we had so anxiously sought and so much valued. So we told the Teutons we would gladly join them as soon as possible, but that to do so while Bulgaria remained undecided would be as dangerous for them as for us.

Constantinople was wholly unprotected against a Bulgarian army. Since the Bulgars hated the Serbs, Germany should be able to persuade Bulgaria to join our alliance. Then, but not till then, Turkey could make good her agreement to fight in aid of Germany.

This logical answer enabled us to delay entering the War. So we waited and watched the course of events. Germany next urged us to conduct our own negotiations with Bulgaria; and as we could not well refuse this, Halil Bey and I went in person to Sofia.

There, after many conferences with the Bulgarian leaders, we realized that they dared not act for fear of Rumania. If Rumania joined Russia, the combined armies could at once overwhelm Bulgaria; hence the latter could promise us nothing unless we could guarantee her against a Rumanian attack. For this reason we left Sofia and proceeded to Bucharest.

There we became convinced after many conferences that Rumania was really determined on a strict neutrality. Radoslavoff, the Bulgarian premier, asked us to get a written promise of this neutrality; but Bratianu, the Rumanian premier, refused this. He said that such a written contract would be un-neutral, but that he could assure me by word of mouth that even if Bulgaria attacked Serbia, Rumania would continue neutral.

This promise seemed to Radoslavoff valuable but insufficient. So we returned unsuccessful to Constantinople.

I am unaware how much the Entente statesmen knew of our efforts in Sofia and Bucharest; but after this expedition matters at Constantinople drifted on as vaguely as before. The Germans and

Austrians continued trying to trick us into the War, and the Entente tried to avoid each quarrel.

We played only for delay, which became constantly more difficult. The German sailors in the city were very hard to control; and the number of German officials increased every day. German influence grew always stronger.

Then came the Black Sea affair. Our German admiral, Souchon, deliberately took our best Turkish ships [the Goeben and others] and bombarded the Russian fleet and some of the Russian cities. We were generally supposed to have sanctioned this; and during the War I let this impression stand, rather than quarrel with the Germans.

Now that I am no longer at the head of affairs, I want it positively known that our Ministry knew nothing of the intended attack. Neither I nor any other official authorized it. On the contrary, we were much upset by it. All the Cabinet members were very angry; we held a hurried meeting, and several of them resigned in protest. The rest of us agreed to try to smooth the matter over.

The Russian ambassador at once sent us a vigorous protest. So did the French and British representatives. The latter two, however, were still hopeful of peace, and proposed that we make our innocence clear by dismissing our German admiral and sailors, and becoming strictly neutral.

We could not prolong this absurd situation. To satisfy the Entente by a public repudiation of Admiral Souchon would have meant the

loss of our German alliance forever. We held another anxious Cabinet meeting, the important one at which war was decided on.

My own position was that while much annoyed at the Black Sea affair, I nevertheless continued to believe that we should join with Germany. The Entente could give us nothing but the renewal of promises, so often broken, to preserve to us our present territory. Hence there was nothing to be gained by joining them.

Moreover, if we refused aid to our German allies now in the time of their need, they would naturally refuse to help us if they were victorious. If we stayed neutral, whichever side won would surely punish Turkey for not having joined them, and would satisfy their territorial ambitions at our expense.

As my country's leader, I surely could not lead her into such a hopeless situation. Therefore, I favoured fighting on the side of Germany. The time of our entering was a lesser matter, though I would have preferred waiting for a more propitious moment.

During our Cabinet discussion news was brought us of an increased gathering of Russian troops upon our Caucasian frontier. The antagonism between the two armies there was already serious. So I advised that we accept the Black Sea affair as our own, put as good a front upon it as we could, and declare war against the Entente.

A majority of the remaining Cabinet members supported me, and the conditions proposed by the French and British ambassadors were refused. Turkey openly joined the Teuton cause.”

Source: *Document in public domain*



## APPENDIX 2

*Ottoman Fatwa of Jihād issued by  
Essad Effendi, Sheik-UI-Islam of the  
Ottoman State, in November 1914*

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### **Fatwa**

If several enemies unite against Islām, if the countries of Islām are sacked, if the Muslim populations are massacred or made captive; and if in this case the Padishah in conformity with the sacred words of the Qur'ān proclaims the *Jihād*, is participation in this war a duty for all Muslims, old and young, cavalry and infantry? Must the Muslims of all countries of Islām hasten with their bodies and possessions to the *Jihād*?

Answer: "Yes."

The Muslim subjects of Russia, of France, of England and of all the countries that side with them in their land and

sea attacks dealt against the *Khilāfah* for the purpose of annihilating Islām, must these subjects, too, take part in the *Jihād* against the respective governments from which they depend?

Answer : "Yes."

Those who at a time when all Muslims are summoned to fight, avoid the struggle and refuse to join in the *Jihād*, are they exposed to the wrath of Allah, to great misfortunes, and to the deserved punishment?

Answer : "Yes."

If the Muslim subjects of the said countries should take up arms against the government of Islām, would they commit an unpardonable sin, even if they had been driven to the war by threats of extermination uttered against themselves and their families?

Answer : "Yes."

The Muslims who in the present war are under England, France, Russia, Serbia, Montenegro and those who give aid to these countries by waging war against Germany and Austria, allies of Turkey, do they deserve to be punished by the wrath of Allah as being the cause of harm and damage to the *Khilāfah* and to Islām?

Answer: "Yes."

Source: *Source Records of the Great War, Vol. III*, ed. Charles F. Horne,  
*National Alumni 1923*



## APPENDIX 3

### *Sharīf Hussein bin Ali's Proclamation to the Muslim world on 27<sup>th</sup> June 1916*

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[With this proclamation he formally announced his independence from the authority of the Ottoman *Khalīfah* who had appointed him *Sharīf* of Makkah, and set the stage to eventually claim the Islamic *Khilāfah* for himself. The loss of control over Makkah and over the annual *Hajj* dealt a psychological and religious death-blow to the legitimacy of the Ottoman *Khalīfah*.

What the proclamation does not do, and should have done, was to also let the Muslim world know that he, Hussein bin Ali, had accepted the offer of the British Ambassador in Egypt and had consented to become a client and ally of Judeo-Christian Britain in return for the princely sum of 7 million pounds from the British government. This was the price Judeo-Christian Britain had to pay to get him to become their client.

Those so-called *Mujāhidīn* who accepted money and arms from Judeo-Christian Zionist NATO as well as strategic assistance from NATO fighter aircraft, in order to overthrow to Libyan government, and who are attempting to repeat that great betrayal in Syria as well, are a people who follow in the wretched footsteps of Hussain bin Ali.]

## **In the Name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate**

This is our general proclamation to all our Brother Muslims.

رَبَّنَا افْتَحْ بَيْنَنَا وَبَيْنَ قَوْمِنَا بِالْحَقِّ وَأَنْتَ خَيْرُ الْفَاتِحِينَ

"Oh Lord-God, do thou judge between us  
and our nation with truth; for Thou art the  
best judge" (Qur'ān, al-'Araf, 7:89)

Of all Muslim Rulers and Emirs, the Emirs of Makkah al-Mukarramah were the first to recognize the Turkish Government.

This they did in order to unite Muslim opinion and firmly establish their community, knowing that the great Ottoman Sultans (may Allah Most High be pleased with them) were acting in accordance with the Qur'ān, the Book of Allah, and the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad

(peace be upon him), were zealous in enforcing, and in being unceasingly sincere to the ordinances of both these authorities.

With this end in view, the afore-noted Emirs observed those ordinances unceasingly. I myself, protecting the honour of the State, caused Arabs to rise against their fellow Arabs in 1327 (1909 of the Christian era) in order to raise the siege of Abha; and in the following year a similar movement was carried out under the leadership of one of my sons.

The Emirs continued to support the Ottoman State until the (secular Turkish nationalist) Society of Union and Progress appeared in the State and assumed full responsibility for the administration of its affairs.

The result of this new administration was that the State lost its territory, thereby weakening its credentials and thereafter faced a perilous status through the ensuing war.

This served to actualize their strategic plan which this exposition is constrained to elaborate upon. Suffice to say that it did lead the Empire of Islam to grieve (in these war-driven times) for the plight of its inhabitants – Muslims as well as non-Muslims – to their persons and/or property – that is, either loss of life through

hanging, driven into exile, or being compelled to sell parts of their homes in order to meet basic needs.

It would seem that these events were insufficient to fulfill the designs of the (secular Turkish nationalist) Society of Union and Progress.

The new administration then proceeded to sever the essential bond between the Ottoman Sultanate and the whole Muslim community, to wit, adherence to the Qur'ān and the Sunnah.

Under the jurisdiction of the ruling of the Ottoman Empire, that is the Grand *Wazīr*, all the *Ulamā*, ministers and nobles, one of the newspapers in Constantinople, viz. *al-Ijtihād* - published an article maligning the life of the Prophet (peace of Allah Most High be upon him). It went further in referring to changes in the Qur'ānic script – the word of God – notably, concerning the Law of Inheritance in according females equal share as opposed to the male receiving two portions, and declaring that during the month of Ramadān troops stationed in Madina, Makkah and Damascus could postpone their fast in the same way as troops fighting on the Russian frontier, thereby falsifying the clear Qur'ānic injunction – “those of you who are sick or on a journey.”

Despite rendering impotent the Sultan's juristic power in robbing him of the right to select personages of his

Imperial Cabinet, and of more critical Islamic importance, in breaking the constitution of the Caliphate, we accepted these innovations so as not to cause dissension that might lead to schisms.

However, the veil was removed when it became apparent that the Empire was in the hands of Enver Pasha, Djemal Pasha and Talaat Bey, who were administering it according to their own wishes.

The most striking proof of this is the ruling sent to the *Qādi* of the Tribunal at Makkah, to the effect that he must deliver judgment solely on the basis of evidence written down in his presence in court, and must not consider any evidence written down by Muslims among themselves, thus ignoring the verse in the *Sūrah al-Baqarah*.

Further proof is found in the ruling that 21 eminent Arab Muslims be put to death by hanging, in addition to those who had previously suffered the same fate - the Emir Omar el-Jazairi, the Emir Arif esh-Shihabi, Shefik Bey el-Moayyad, Shukri Bey elAsali, Abd el-Wahab, Taufk Bey el-Baset, Abd el-Hamid al-Zahrawi and Abd el-Ghani el-Arisi.

Such cruelty defies moral reasoning. Calling for the death of worthy men is bad enough, but to render vulnerable their innocent family members who were

forced to endure hardship with the loss of the source of livelihood is indefensible.

Allah says in the Qur'ān "No burdened soul shall bear the burden of another." Even if we could allow all of this to pass, how can we forgive their confiscating the property and money of families after bereaving them of their dear ones?

The ultimate reprehensible act was their desecrating the grave of that pious, zealous and godly man, the Sherif Abd el-Qādir el-Jazāiri el-Ilasani?

The above provides evidence of the conduct of this administration and we can, at best, leave humanity at large and Muslims in particular to give their verdict.

The afore-mentioned atrocities provide proof of the way the Arab people were regarded. But additional proof appeared when the people rose up to demand their independence (from Turkish rule) and they witnessed disrespect of their religion when large gun shots were fired against the *Ka'aba* – the Temple of the Divine Unity and *Qibla* of the Muslim Ummah, of which it is said, in the word of Allah, "Purify my House for those that pass round it." One of the gun-shots fell about a yard and a half above the Black Stone, and the other, three yards from it. The covering of the *Ka'aba* was set ablaze. Thousands of Muslims rushed up with shouts of alarm and in

despair to extinguish the flames. They were compelled to open the door of the *Ka'aba* and to climb on to the roof. The enemy fired a third shell at the *Makām Ibrahīm*. With three or four people being killed each day inside the *Ka'aba*, this created great difficulty in gaining safe access to the sacred building.

We leave the whole Muslim community around the world, from East to West, to pass judgment on this contempt and profanity of the Sacred House. But we are determined not to leave our religious and national rights as a plaything in the hands of the secular Turkish nationalist Union and Progress Party.

Allah Most High has vouchsafed to safeguard this land through resisting oppression and eventually to gain prosperity and victory despite being crushed by the maladministration of the Turkish civil and military officials.

She stands quite apart and distinct from countries that still groan under the yoke of the Union and Progress Government. She is independent, in the fullest sense of the word, freed from the rule of strangers and purged of every foreign influence. Her principles are to defend the faith of Islam; to elevate the Muslim people, to found their conduct on Holy Law, to build up the code of justice on the same foundation in harmony with the principles of religion, to practise its ceremonies in

accordance with modern progress and make a genuine revolution by ensuring that there is no bar to access to education amongst all classes.

This is the policy we have undertaken in order to fulfill our religious duty, trusting that all our brother Muslims in the East and West will pursue the same in fulfillment of their duty to us, and so strengthen the Islamic brotherhood.

We raise our hands humbly to the Lord of Lords for the sake of the Prophet of the All-Bountiful King that we may be granted success and guidance in whatsoever is for the good of Islam and the Muslims. We rely upon Almighty Allah, who is our Sufficient for our needs and the best to Protect.

The Sharīf and Emir of Makkah,  
EL HUSSEIN IBN ALI  
*25 Sha'bān 1334 (June 27, 1916)*

Source: *Source Records of the Great War, Vol. IV*, ed.  
Charles F. Horne, *National Alumni 1923*.

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